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HOMOLOGIZING PREGNANCY AND 
MOTHERHOOD: A CONSIDERATION 
OF ABORTION 
Julia E. Hanigsberg* 
INTRODUCTION: MOTHERING AND MATIERING 
The abortion issue has been the subject of an enormous legal 
literature.1 The contours of its legal analysis in the United States 
are, by now, relatively well known. The right to abortion has been 
protected under the rubric of the right to privacy guaranteed by the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
in the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.2 
In this essay I reconsider abortion in order to bridge what ini-
tially seem to be two opposing frameworks: first, the conception of 
abortion as an issue of women's bodily integrity and liberty, and 
second, the acknowledgement of the existence and meaning of in-
trauterine life.3 The abortion choice is indeed deeply and necessar-
ily tied to women's bodily integrity. I will discuss how taking away 
* Associate in Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.C.L. 1991, LL.B. 1991, Mc-
Gill; LL.M. 1995, Columbia. - Ed. For invaluable criticism of earlier drafts of this paper as 
well as generous sharing of insight and knowledge, I am indebted to Sherry Colb, Drucilla 
Cornell, Martha A. Fineman, Lisa Ikemoto, Linda McClain, Sara Ruddick, Carol Sanger, 
Lome Sessin, Nomi Stolzenberg, and Patricia J. Williams. This paper was presented at the 
1995 meeting of the Law and Society Association. Part I draws upon Daughters and Determi-
nation: Abortion and the Impossibility of Decision-Making, which was presented at a joint 
session of the Canadian Political Science Association and the Canadian Law and Society 
Association, and the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, both in June 1994. Fi-
nally, I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada, the Canada-U.S. Fulbright Program, and Columbia Law 
School. This essay was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. 
1. See, for example, works cited in the bibliography of JANINE BRODIE ET AL., THE Pou. 
TICS OF ABORTION 186-98 (1992). A Westlaw search of articles with the word "abortion" in 
the title finds 320 entries. 
2. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-06 (1992); Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). 
· 3. I use the far from perfect term "intrauterine life" for two reasons: first, in the interest 
of precision, to include both embryo and fetus; second, in order to attempt to complicate the 
analysis of pregnancy without falling into the rhetoric of the "pro-life" movement and its 
emphasis on the rights of the "fetus" or "unborn" or "pre-born" or "unborn child" as static 
and immutable. See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Book Review, 37 McGILL L.J. 928 (1992) (review-
ing CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SO-
CIAL CHANGE (1990)). 
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women's ability to control their decision not to become mothers can 
be severely damaging to their very sense of self, for this denial of 
decisionmaking divides women from their wombs and uses their 
wombs for a purpose unrelated to women's own aspirations. By 
interfering in unique ways with women's bodily integrity in the 
guise of regulation of procreative decisionmaking, law both facili-
tates and justifies that violation of bodily integrity. Because bodily 
integrity is necessary for the formation of selfhood, it is essential 
that law recognize women's subjectivity in its construction of 
women's procreative lives.4 The legal regulation of procreation, in 
this sense, defines women's very boundaries. 
By suggesting a connection between mothering and abortion, 
however, I seek to highlight that a strict bodily integrity framework 
is incomplete because it does not acknowledge intrauterine life. 
Pro-choice considerations of the abortion issue have largely failed 
to account for intrauterine life and the meaning that life has,s while 
anti-abortion accounts are insufficiently concerned with women. 
The rhetoric of both sides - "choice" vs. "life" - oversimplifies 
the complexity of the abortion issue: the language of "choice" sug-
gests that mere legalization of abortion will provide women with 
real choices without accounting for structural inequalities that cur-
tail such autonomy;6 the adoption of the term "pro-life" both sug-
gests that those who favor legal abortion lack concern for life and 
obscures the fact that the "pro-life" movement has been consist-
ently more concerned with "the unborn" than the conditions of liv-
ing women and children.7 Thus, this paper will stand back from 
both sides of the abortion debate in an effort to provide a complex 
articulation of the nature of abortion, and to elucidate why this is-
sue is, from both a legal and political perspective, enormously diffi-
4. This is not to say, I emphasize, that women are constituted by their ability to bear 
children. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HAR.v. L. REV. 737, 782 {1989). To 
the contrary, to the extent that law interferes with women's ability to make procreative deci-
sions, the law reduces them to their childbearing capacity. 
5. Some feminists, such as Ruth Colker, have begun to integrate a consideration of in-
trauterine life into their analysis of abortion. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and 
Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1054-60 (1989); 
see also Jean L. Cohen, Redescribing Privacy: Identity, Difference, and the Abortion Contro· 
versy, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 43, 78 {1992). See generally RUTII COLKER, ABORTION AND 
DIALOGUE (1992). 
6. Choice is relatively meaningless in the face of inadequate options from which to 
choose. For an exploration of this argument and the connections between choice and auton-
omy, see JOSEPH RAz, THE MoRAUTY OF FREEDOM 369-99 {1986). 
7. See Hanigsberg, supra note 3, at 933; cf. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 
HARV. L. REv. 105, 128 {1989) (remarking that society's undervaluation of women produces 
an overvaluation of fetal life). 
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cult to regulate. It is perhaps useful at this point to note that my 
project is not, first or foremost, to find a compromise position to 
unite opponents in the abortion debate. Indeed, I suspect that such 
compromise is unlikely, particularly given the current political and 
ideological bent of the "pro-life" movement in the United States as 
it is presently constituted and largely controlled by the extreme 
political and Christian right.8 
I posit the view that abortion, and indeed all procreative deci-
sionmaking,9 is about mothering in its broadest terms, and it is thus 
that I will make use of the term mothering decisions throughout this 
article. Even when a woman decides to have an abortion, she is still 
making a mothering decision. I will discuss at some length why I 
think this is the case, but at the very least, it is because restriction of 
women's access to abortion forces women to bear children - to 
become, at least, biological mothers.10 I will also show how atti-
tudes toward mothers are crucial to the way that North American 
law and culture defines women, and therefore that the way mother-
8. For discussions of the possibility of compromise, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, 
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW {1990); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE 
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES {1990); and Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Com-
promise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1993). For an excellent elaboration of the political forces 
that make compromise impossible, see Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise - Inevitable 
and Impossible, 1992 U. Ju .. L. REv. 921, 938. 
9. I use "procreativity" and "procreative" because I think the word "reproduction" needs 
to be treated critically. "Reproduction" suggests technology, manufacturing, and alienation 
of procreative labor in the context of childbearing. 
[The word "reproduction"] derives from the word "production", which implies a 
mechanical process. Production describes the making of commodities. The metaphor of 
production is the dominant medical metaphor to describe the process of menstruation, 
pregnancy and birth: women are the machines that must produce a perfect product, a 
healthy baby. Just as machines are separate from their products, so too are women 
separate from their "products", children. 
Donna Greschner, Abortion and Democracy for Women: A Critique of Tremblay v. Daigle, 
35 McGILL L.J. 633, 647-48 (1990) (citation omitted). In the parlance of obstetrics textbooks: 
Labor is work; mechanically, work is the generation of motion against resistance. The 
forces involved in labor are those of the uterus and the abdomen that act to expel the 
fetus and that must overcome the resistance offered by the cervix to dilation and the 
friction created by the birth canal during passage of the presenting part. 
JACK A. PRITCHARD & PAUL C. MAcDONALD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 1980 (16th ed. 1980), 
quoted in Emily Martin, The Ideology of Reproduction: The Reproduction of Ideology, in 
UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 300, 302 (Faye 
Ginsburg & Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990); see also Judith Grant, Intimate Work: The 
Regulation of Female Sexuality and Reproduction, 1 S. CAL REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 225 
(1992). Procreation is not merely the physiological fact of pregnancy and childbearing. An-
thropologist Carol Delaney has called it "the beliefs related to the question of how life comes 
into being" and notes that "[p ]rocreation, it must be stressed, is not just the fact of physiolog-
ical reproduction, but the way it is symbolized and understood." Carol Delaney, Seeds of 
Honor, Fields of Shame, in HONOR AND SHAME AND TiiE UNITY OF TiiE MEDITERRANEAN 
35, 36, 44 (David Gilmore ed., 1987). 
10. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 788; Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A His-
torical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 261, 350 {1992). 
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hood is regulated is significant to all women regardless of whether 
they ever do bear, or even are capable of bearing, children.11 This 
significance is even greater because of the phenomenon that I call 
homologizing. I use this term to refer to the way that pregnancy 
and motherhood are treated as though they are corresponding 
states of being. By a legal, political, and social process, pregnancy 
and motherhood are made to resemble each other. There are two 
sides to this process. First, in a benign way, women making procre-
ative decisions, including the decision whether or not to abort, are 
making mothering decisions. These mothering decisions include 
calculations about what would be best for the woman, the intrauter-
ine life, and others. Second, in an invidious way, even women who 
are merely pregnant are subject to regulatory frameworks inspired 
by viewing pregnant women as already being mothers. 
It makes sense at the outset to try to explain why the regulation 
of motherhood and the ideological underpinnings of this regulation 
have broad significance for all women, not just mothers. First, re-
gardless of women's individual choices or capacities, society in-
cludes them within the category of "mother."12 A woman's 
position in the work force can be altered because of her presumed 
fertility and its ramifications and social signification.13 Two exam-
ples are instructive. Employers act on a presumption that women 
are likely to leave their jobs in order to bear and raise children at 
some point in their work lives.14 Therefore all women, regardless of 
11. Siegel states the following: 
Ideological norms and institutional practices pertaining to reproduction play a central 
part in defining women's status, the dignity they are accorded, the degradations to which 
they are subjected, and the degree of autonomy they are allowed or dependency they 
must suffer. These norms and practices affect women who are mothers most intensely, 
but in one way or another they affect all women. 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 267. 
12. Martha Fineman has referred to this as a "colonized category." See MARTIIA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MoTIIER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 0nmR TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 51 (1995); see also MOTiiERS IN LAW: FEMINISM AND TiiE 
LEGAL REGULATION OF MoTiiERHOOD (Martha A. Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); 
Lisa Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Mother-
hood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Omo 
ST. L.J. 1205, 1304 (1992) ("The Good Mother tends to be used as a universal standard. It is 
applied to all women in a way that ignores the social reality in which they live."). 
13. See Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to 
Fetus-Envy?, 72 B.U. L. REv. 101, 131 (1992). 
14. Census data indicate that 85-90% of women of childbearing age expect to conceive at 
least once. See Patricia Schroeder, ls There a Role for the Federal Government in Work and 
the Family?, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 301 (1989). Some 45% of mothers of children under 
the age of four stay home. Most of these women, however, will return to the work force 
before their children reach the age of majority. See Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single 
Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 56 (1995) (citing census and National Research Council 
Data). 
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their actual intention of having children or whether they ever do 
leave the work force for child rearing reasons, become burdened by 
the mere possibility of their becoming mothers.15 Employers re-
spond to this presumption by tracking women into jobs that accord 
them less respect and fewer opportunities for advancement than 
their male colleagues.16 Women thus face "statistical discrimina-
tion"17 based on the presumption of fertility and its social conse-
quences and thereby are disadvantaged in the wage labor market.18 
A second example is the illegal attempt by employers to ban fertile 
women from workplaces that are allegedly dangerous to fetuses re-
gardless of whether the female employees were pregnant or even 
had any intention of becoming pregnant. The Seventh Circuit, in 
UAWv. Johnson Controls, Inc., 19 accepted the company's argument 
that its exclusion of "women who are pregnant or who are capable 
of bearing children"20 from working in areas of the factory where 
lead levels reached a certain concentration was justified as a bona 
fide occupational qualification.21 Although the judgment was ·over-
turned on appea1,22 it reflects how women without children, without 
even the intention of ever bearing children, can be affected socio-
economically by their presumed ability to become mothers.23 
Second, significant social stigma may attach to women who 
choose not to mother. Such women continue to be viewed through 
the lens of motherhood: their decision not to mother is itself con-
sidered deviant antimatemalism.24 Third, large numbers of work-
15. See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family 
Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 363-64 (1993). 
16. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 V AND. L REv. 1183, 1185 (1989). 
17. See Samuel lssacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommo-
dating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2168 (1994). 
18. See Dowd, supra note 14, at 57. 
19. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), revd., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
20. 886 F.2d at 876. The fetal protection policy defined this as "[a]ll women except those 
whose inability to bear children is medically documented." 886 F.2d at 876 n.8. 
21. See 886 F.2d at 871. 
22. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
23. See discussion in Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without 
Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1992). 
24. See Martha Giminez, Feminism, Pronatalism and Motherhood, in MoTiiERJNo: Es-
SAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 287 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); Charlene E. Miall, Reproductive 
Technology v. the Stigma of Involuntary Childlessness, 70 J. CoNTEMP. Soc. WoRK 43 (1989); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM. U. J. GEN-
DER & L. 1, 5 (1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy] (noting that women who 
do not become mothers are stigmatized for not following the dominant norm and considered 
deviants or criminals); Siegel, supra note 10, at 379 (noting that women who seek to avoid 
maternity are castigated as lacking in humanity); Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and 
Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1483, 1508 (1991) 
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ing class women and women of color have a unique position with 
respect to mothering because their economic labor is often in the 
area of motherwork - that is, paid labor with a significant child 
care component. Therefore, even if they choose not to become 
mothers, they may still be mothering in a broader sense of the 
word. For example, studies have shown that more than ninety-five 
percent of child care workers are women, and among those more 
than one-third are black or Latina.25 Women also constitute the 
vast majority of workers in occupations that require caregiving.26 
Fourth, for African-American women, motherhood includes the 
legacy of the control of their procreativity under slavery. Female 
slaves, in addition to performing work expected of men, bore the 
burden of reproduction of the slave workforce, domestic labor of 
White owners, and wet-nursing - all, once again, mothenvork.27 
(describing how women in the United States are generally perceived and treated as mothers); 
Enid Nemy, No Children. No Apologies., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at C12 (describing the 
"Childfree Network," a support system for people who do not have children, and the stigma 
attached to childlessness); cf. ELIZABETH BARTiiOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND nm 
Pouncs OF PARENTING 24-38 (1993) (discussing social forces that create biases in favor of 
biological parenting as opposed to adoptive parenting). 
Despite the fact that Black motherhood is devalued, the dominant ideology that all 
women are destined to be mothers still affects Black women. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Moth· 
erhood and Crime, 79 low AL. REV. 95, 97 n.10 (1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Motherhood and 
Crime]. 
25. See BARBARA KA'IZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTiiERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECH-
NOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 200-01 (1989). She notes also that the median income 
for child care workers in 1985 was under $6000 per annum. Martha Fineman points out that: 
An egalitarian family typically hires someone to care for the children (or other depen-
dents). This hardly seems an acceptable feminist solution, however, given that caretak-
ing is undervalued and underpaid in the "commercial" context as well as within the 
family. All too often, it is women of African American or Hispanic decent who are 
called upon to subsidize the middle-class woman's ideal of equal partnership in mar-
riage. The expectation that caretaking is a private matter means that someone's (some 
woman's) labor will be undervalued even if it is compensated. 
FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 166 (citation omitted). 
26. See Sau-ling C. Wong, Diverted Mothering: Representations of Caregivers of Color in 
the Age of "Multiculturalism," in MOTiiERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY 67, 
71-72 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994) (indicating that women are the vast majority in 
occupations requiring caregiving, which are also, typically, low-paying, low status jobs. In 
addition, among those women, women of color, including immigrant women of the Third 
World are increasingly the mainstay of caregiving industries); NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON 
PAY EQUITY: AN ISSUE OF RACE, ETiiNICITY AND SEX 20-26 (1987) (citing statistics that 
demonstrate that Black women are concentrated in service-oriented occupations), cited in 
Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 20 n.106. 
27. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLAss 6 (1983); BELL HooKS, AIN'T I A 
WOMAN 39 (1981); PATRICIA J, WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 18-19 
(1991}; Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TuL. L. REV. 1945, 1970 
(1993) [hereinafter Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction] ("Female slaves were commer-
cially valuable to their masters not only for their labor, but also for their capacity to produce 
more slaves. White masters therefore could increase their wealth by controlling their slaves' 
reproductive capacity through rewarding pregnancy, punishing slave women who did not 
bear children, forcing them to breed, and raping them." (citations omitted}); Roberts, Racism 
and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 7 ("The social order established by white slaveowners was 
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Fifth, all fertile women are potentially subject to unintended 
motherhood either as a result of rape28 or incest or because of the 
fallibility of even the most reliable birth control.29 Finally, of 
course, many women do mother their own children, in the more 
traditional sense of the word, albeit in a variety of domestic rela-
tionships often outside of the nuclear family, and through forms of 
impregnation not limited to heterosexual intercourse. 
Norms about mothering affect all women, but these norms do 
not have the same significance for all women, nor do all women 
similarly experience mothering. For example, most White mothers 
do not experience the pain of raising Black children in a racist soci-
ety. 30 Nevertheless, because "[a]ll women are, at least to some ex-
founded on two inseparable ingredients: the dehumanization of Africans on the basis of 
race, and the control of women's sexuality and reproduction."). 
This legacy includes eugenics, birth control aimed at the Black population in the 1930s, 
sterilization abuse of Black Americans, and proposals to give women on welfare incentives to 
use Norplant. See Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, supra, at 1971-72. Roberts cites 
Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), in which a district court found that an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 poor people were 
sterilized annually under federally funded programs. 
28. The socio-historical meaning of rape is not, however, the same for all women. Rape 
has been constructed along racial lines as a crime perpetrated on white women by Black men 
thus making its meaning different for Black and White women in general but also with regard 
to their procreative and mothering capacities. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Whose Story is 
it, Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JusnCE, EN-
GENDERING POWER: EsSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCilON 
OF SOCIAL REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The Mind That 
Burns in Each Body": Women, Rape, and Racial Violence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLI-
TICS OF SEXUALITY 328 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983). Patricia Hill Collins traces the influ-
ence of this rape into contemporary society and the facile notion of reproductive "choice" 
and "control" of motherhood: 
The ambiguous politics of caring for unplanned children has long shaped African-
American women's motherwork. For example, the widespread institutionalized rape of 
Black women by white men, both during slavery and in the segregated South, created 
countless biracial children who had to be absorbed into African-American families and 
communities. The range of skin colors and hair textures in contemporary African-
American communities bears mute testament to the powerlessness of African-American 
women in controlling this dimension of motherhood. 
Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing About Mother-
hood, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 26, at 45, 53 (cita-
tion omitted). 
29. Forty-seven percent of unintended pregnancies occur in women who are using contra-
ception at the time of the pregnancy. For example, six percent of oral-contraceptive users 
become pregnant within the first year of use. See Rachel B. Gold & Cory L. Richards, Secur-
ing American Women's Reproductive Health, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1994-95, at 196, 
203, 205 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. Stone eds., 1994). 
30. See Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 4-5 ("It is impossible to explain 
the depth of sorrow felt at the moment a mother realizes she birthed her precious brown 
baby into a society that regards her child as just another unwanted Black charge. Black 
mothers must bear the incredible task of guarding their children's identity against innumera-
ble messages that brand them as less than human."). But see Lisa Jones & Hettie Jones, 
Mama's White, EssENCE, May 1994, at 78 (exploring the racism of a Black woman and her 
White mother). On the complexity of these categories in the context of both family and 
politics, see Judy Trent-Scales, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the 
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tent, judged as 'Woman,' " all women can be said to have an 
interest in collaborating on issues with a gendered implication in 
their lives.31 Such an understanding does not require the privileg-
ing of any one oppression or a belief that racism or patriarchy32 is 
dominant.33 Rather, racism and patriarchy are "mutually support-
ing systems of domination."34 It is this reality of gender and race 
that makes the forging of alliances across differences, albeit shifting 
and impermanent ones, both possible and necessary.3s This essay 
thus positions itself in a zone of tension: on the one hand I have 
already asserted grounds to suggest the importance of motherhood 
for all women, yet at the same time, considerations of diversity -
of race and socio-economic status - should not be a convenient 
way to force others into a fixed paradigm. Therefore, although 
we must be wary of feminist theory's tendency to homogenize 
women's experience, it remains both possible and useful to talk 
about "women" and "mothers,'' and to bear in mind that control 
Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990); see also SHIRLEE TAYLOR HAIZLIP, THE 
SWEETER THE JUICE (1994). 
31. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 13. Fineman has developed the notion of a "gendered 
life" which she describes as follows: 
The idea of a gendered life is based on the premise that as a socially and legally defined 
group, women share the potential for experiencing a variety of situations, statuses, and 
ideological and political impositions in which their gender is culturally relevant. These 
experiences, be they actual or potential, provide the occasion for women to develop an 
identifiable perspective that is rooted in their appreciation of, and reaction to, the 
gendered nature of our social world. This concept does not assume that women respond 
identically to an appreciation of gendered existence. It does presume that with gender 
revealed as a central social and cultural consideration, women's attention in many areas 
can be directed productively toward confronting and challenging the gendered implica-
tions of our lives. 
Id. at 47-48. 
32. "Patriarchy" has been defined as the "manifestation and institutionalization of male 
dominance over women and children ... and [its extension] over women in society in gen-
eral." GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 239 (1986). But see FINEMAN, supra 
note 12, at 23 (criticizing the structural critique of patriarchy and claiming that the focus 
should be on the ideological aspect of patriarchy); see also ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN 
BoRN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 40 (Bantam Books 1977) (1976) 
("Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-social, ideological, political system in 
which men - by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law, and language, cus-
toms, etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or 
shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male."). 
33. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 546 (describing this phe-
nomenon as the "running of the oppression sweepstakes"). 
34. See Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, supra note 27, at 1977; see also Roberts, 
Racism and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 37. 
35. See Irus MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 171 (1990) 
(arguing for group identifications that address political necessity, while allowing for the fact 
that these identifications shift and lack clear borders; she calls this a "relational understand-
ing" of difference). 
November 1995] Abortion 379 
of women's reproduction is fundamental to race and class 
oppression. 36 
I take the position that mothering matters to all women because 
of the variety of ways in which motherhood is imposed on women's 
experiences because they are women. It matters to each woman 
whether she is a mother or not. Mothering matters because it has 
historically been, and continues to be, a locus of subordination for 
women in North American society.37 If mothering matters in the 
36. See Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, supra note 27, at 1977 ("The conver-
gence of crime, race, and reproduction illustrates how racism and patriarchy function as mu-
tually supporting systems of domination."). Patriarchy and racism converged when eugenics 
and the glorification of the feminine sphere were combined with restrictions on abortion in 
Nazi Germany as a means of racist population control. 
[W]here sexism and racism exist, particularly with Nazi features, all women are equally 
involved in both, but with different experiences. They are subjected to one coherent and 
double-edged policy of sexist racism or racist sexism (a nuance only of perspective), but 
they are segregated as they live through the dual sides of this policy, a division that also 
works to segregate their forms of resistance to sexism as well as to racism. 
Gisela Bock, Racism and Sexism in Nazi Germany: Motherhood, Compulsory Sterilization 
and the State, in WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GER-
MANY 271, 288 (Renate Bridenthal et al. eds., 1984). See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics (1989), reprinted in FEMINisr 
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 57 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne 
Kennedy eds., 1991). 
37. One example is that the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy, which it characterized as discrimination between "pregnant women" and 
"nonpregnant persons," does not constitute sex discrimination. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974) (upholding California's disability insurance program, which 
did not provide coverage for pregnancy). The Court stated that "[t]here is no risk from 
which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women 
are protected and men are not." 417 U.S. at 496-97. The Court also stated that "[t]he Cali-
fornia insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender 
but merely removes one physical condition - pregnancy - from the list of compensable 
disabilities. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20; see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) 
(applying Geduldig's reasoning in the context of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination 
in employment); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 760 (1993) 
(stating that opposing abortion and blocking access to abortion is not sex discrimination and 
citing Geduldig). But see Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (Can.) (hold-
ing that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination under the 
Human Rights Act of Manitoba of S.M. 1974, c. 65). In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), amending Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
For the limitations of the protections afforded under the amended Title VII, see Troupe v. 
May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) ("Employers can treat 
pregnant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but non-pregnant employees."); 
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), affd., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 
1987) (firing of African-American employee of Girls Club when she became pregnant be-
cause of her violation of role model requirement justified under bona fide occupational quali-
fication and business necessity defenses); and Austin, supra note 33 (discussing Chambers); 
see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCI10N OF MOTHERING 9 (1978) ("[W]omen's 
mothering is a central and defining feature of the social organization of gender and is impli-
cated in the construction and reproduction of male dominance •... "); and FINEMAN, supra 
note 12, at 103. See generally ZILLAH R. EISENsrEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 98-
100 (1988) (critiquing both Geduldig and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Colb, supra 
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way I suggest, it makes sense to rethink how decisions not to 
mother, including the decision to abort, should be construed le-
gally.38 More specifically, how should the abortion decision be en-
visioned within a framework of mothering, and how should pro-
choice analyses confront the significance of intrauterine life? This 
is not an argument that intrauterine life "is" a child, or should be 
accorded the rights of an adult person in law.39 It is indeed this 
dangerous and allegedly inescapable implication that I believe has 
kept feminist theorists, in particular, from adequately theorizing 
about the importance or meaning of intrauterine life. Rather I 
want to highlight the inadequacy of interpretations of the abortion 
decision that ignore intrauterine life, and deplore the rhetoric that 
allows only the "pro-life" side of the political coin to evince any 
concern for "life." 
In Part I, I discuss bodily integrity in law and how women's bod-
ies have been treated differently from men's. I sketch out a theory 
of the abortion decision and its relationship to selfhood that con-
nects the ability to make this decision to women's capacity to form 
a stable sense of bodily integrity. By employing the term "bodily 
integrity" I mean to articulate women's need to maintain a sense of 
wholeness, of coherence, and, at its most corporeal, of "physical pa-
rameters. "40 The shift from traditional approaches to abortion that 
this perspective suggests is that the abortion decision is not only 
about autonomy in the sense of self-determination, but in the more 
radical sense of self simpliciter. Alienating women from their pro-
note 13, at 126-39 (discussing Geduldig and Johnson Controls and showing how "[s]tructuring 
the world around male life effectively punishes women for experiences only they can have"); 
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 17, at 2179-99. 
38. Under American constitutional law, the question is conceptualized as one of privacy. 
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Canada, it has developed as a question of 
security of the person. See R. v. Morgentaler, (1988) 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.). Some scholars have 
argued that the issue should be addressed as one of gender equality. E.g. CATIIARINE A. 
MAcKlNNoN, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93 
(1987); Olsen, supra note 7; Siegel, supra note 10; Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1 (1992). Others have argued that the question should be framed in terms of bodily 
integrity. E.g. DRUCILLA CORNELL, Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs, in THE IM· 
AGINARY DOMAIN: A DISCOURSE ON PORNOGRAPHY, ABORTION AND SEXUAL HARASS· 
MENT (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript on file with author); Christyne L. Neff, Woman, 
Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 327 (1991). I draw particular attention 
to the bodily integrity argument in this essay. 
39. Cf. Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Concep-
tion," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600-01 (1991) (discussing the problems with and consequences 
of deeming the fetus a person in the abortion context and other contexts). 
40. In sum, this perspective mandates a recognition that women's physical boundaries 
encompass their wombs. See Neff, supra note 38, at 328. 
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creative choices inhibits their ability to form a coherent sense of 
self. 
It is, however, insufficient to discuss abortion solely in terms of 
bodily integrity. In Part II, I discuss how abortion is a kind of 
mothering decision. I elaborate on what I call the homologizing of 
pregnancy and motherhood, both as a matter of law and culture, 
and as a matter of the experience of pregnancy and its conceptual-
ization in language. I also interrogate the meaning of intrauterine 
life within a feminist pro-choice framework and show that part of 
the difficulty in discussing abortion as both a political and legal 
matter is that it is perceived as a particularly egregious form of bad 
mothering. As a result, abortion becomes enmeshed in a complex 
set of beliefs and practices that stem from the ideology of 
motherhood. 
I. THE BODY IN LAW: BODILY INTEGRITY AND SUBJECTIVITY 
It is clear to me, that ... all our little skirmishing for better laws, and 
the right to vote, will yet be swallowed up in the real question, viz: 
Has woman a right to herself? It is very little to me to have the right 
to vote, to own property, &c. if I may not keep my body, and its uses, 
in my absolute right. Not one wife in a thousand can do that now, and 
as long as she suffers this bondage, all other rights will not help her to 
her true position.41 
The abortion context provides the archetypal example of the 
connection between bodily integrity and selfhood. This is true de-
spite the fact that the Court in Roe42 gave short shrift to the bodily 
integrity argument made before it.43 Bodily integrity is con-
structed, 44 for it is developed according to a variety of cultural 
mechanisms and bolstered by other persons' statements and behav-
41. ELIZABETH CAZDEN, ANTOINETIE BROWN BLACKWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 100 (1983) 
(Lucy Stone writing to Antoinette Brown in 1855). 
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
43. See 410 U.S. at 154 (Blackmun, J.) ("[I]t is not clear to us that the claim asserted by 
some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close 
relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court 
has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past."); see also Neff, supra 
note 38, at 328. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2846 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[C]ompelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a 
woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant 
risks of physical harm."). 
44. See Rayna Rapp, Constructing Amniocentesis: Maternal and Medical Discourses, in 
UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE, supra note 9, at 28, 28 
("[A]s the field of medical anthropology constantly reminds us, bodies are also and always 
culturally constituted, and their aches, activities, and accomplishments are continuously as-
signed meanings."). 
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iors.45 Thus, our bodies, by which I mean our symbolic interpreta-
tion and sense of dominion over our bodies, are central to our 
identity and our personal dignity. This is not a simple physical fact. 
While a missing body part does not result in a loss of identity46 and 
the symbolic meaning we give to our bodies is culturally and histori-
cally mediated, our selves and our identities become implicated by 
our bodies and how we experience them.47 This view of bodily in-
tegrity also occurs in constitutional discourse. Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in the "right-to-die" case, Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health, 48 observes, 
Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea 
of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often 
deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.49 
A sense of control over our own bodies is crucial for maintain-
ing both a sense of self and an ability to interact with others. In 
order to have a sense of self, the individual must believe that she 
can coordinate her body's functions autonomously and regulate ac-
cess to it.so Without recognition by others of her autonomous con-
trol over her body and her bodily integrity, without at least this 
most basic acknowledgment of dignity, the individual's self-image 
becomes crippled along with the security she needs in order to in-
45. For example, a parent who holds an infant up to a mirror allowing it to visualize itself 
as a whole before it has any ability actually to see itself without outside aid helps in the 
formation of a sense of bodily integrity. See JACQUES LACAN, The mi;ror stage as formative 
of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience, in ECRITS: A SELEcnON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). 
46. But the "loss" of body parts does have a psychological impact. Oliver Sacks describes 
in the following terms the experience of severe nerve damage to his leg: 
The surgeon's original words recurred to me, "You've been disconnected. We recon-
nect you. That's all." What he meant, in a purely local and anatomical sense, had, I now 
felt, a much vaster (if unintended) sense - the sense in which E. M. Forster says "Only 
connect." For what was disconnected was not merely nerve and muscle but, in conse-
quence of this, the natural and innate unity of body and mind. The "will" was unstrung, 
precisely as the nerve-muscle. The "spirit" was ruptured, precisely as the body. Both 
were split, and split off from one another. And, since "body" and "soul" have sense only 
insofar as they are one, both became senseless when they no longer connected. 
OLIVER SACKS, A LEG TO STAND ON 104 (1984). 
47. See CoRNELL, supra note 38; Cohen, supra note 5, at 113; Margaret Jane Radin, Prop-
erty and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 965-68 (1982). Of course, the physically handi-
capped must cope both with the psychological and corporeal consequences of the loss of 
bodily autonomy that accompanies disability. 
48. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
49. 497 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
50. For a discussion of this kind of phenomenon as a neurological disorder, see Oliver 
Sacks's description of the "disembodiment" of a female patient who had lost her sense of 
proprioception - the literal loss of a sense of her body and its boundaries. See Oliver Sacks, 
The Disembodied Lady, in THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT 42 (1985); see also 
Radin, supra note 47. 
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teract successfully with others and to express her own needs and 
feelings. The sanctity of bodily integrity thus surpasses its corporeal 
component: "[T]he constitutional protection for the human body is 
surely inseparable from concern for the mind and spirit that dwell 
therein. "Sl 
Something resembling this conception of bodily integrity can be 
found in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision striking down the 
abortion restrictions then contained in the Criminal Code. s2 In 
coming to its conclusion, the Court offers strong support of 
women's bodily integrity: 
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to 
term unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities 
and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman's body and 
thus a violation of security of the person.s3 
What is at stake in the abortion controversy is precisely a woman's 
sense of selfhood and identity. 
Bodily integrity is not merely something that one has, but rather 
something that must be produced and protected.s4 Complete and 
total bodily integrity is, however, an illusion - an aspiration rather 
than a fact. Human beings never have total bodily integrity. We 
are contained by our skins, but we are not impermeable. Our very 
physical borders are a conduit from inside to out and back. We 
breathe, we perspire, we ingest drugs through our skin, we make 
love. Substances penetrate our bodies from without continuously.ss 
51. 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
52. See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 30 (Can.) (holding abortion restrictions 
unconstitutional by virtue of the "security of the person" branch of§ 7 of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects "life, liberty and security of the person"). 
53. [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 56-57. 
54. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 790 ("[A]nti-abortion laws exert power productively 
over a woman's body and, through the uses to which her body is put, forcefully re-shape and 
redirect her life."). 
55. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 114 n.215 ("Of course, this sense of control is symbolic 
and social (we accord it to one another) - no one can actually control her body fully."); 
Delaney, supra note 9, at 41 ("A woman is not self-contained, her personal boundaries are 
diffuse and permeable, and these physical attributes take on moral qualities."); Martin, supra 
note 9, at 301 (discussing the 16th-century conceptual opposition between the "classical 
body" and the "grotesque body,'' the latter becoming thought of as naturally feminine; she 
describes the grotesque body as follows: "[It] is not separated from the rest of the world. It 
is not a closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits"); 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 176 
(1990) ("The human skin is perhaps the most compelling alternative to the wall image of 
boundaries: it is permeable, slowly and constantly changing while keeping its basic contours, 
and a source of sensitive connection to the rest of the world."). 
In the specific context of the pregnant body, Iris Marion Young describes changing 
boundaries: 
Pregnancy challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering fluid the 
boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I experience my 
insides as the space of another, yet my own body .... 
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Law is part and parcel of the process of the production and pro-
tection of bodily integrity. Law reifies bodily integrity by investing 
meaning and significance in it. To have meaning, bodily integrity 
must be supported by a regulatory infrastructure, and law is part of 
this infrastructure. Law is not simply prescriptive but has a role in 
shaping one's self-perceptions, for the law not only recognizes, but 
also constitutes and confirms who is valued, who matters - who is 
a person.56 For example, when women were not legal "persons" 
and their rights could not be recognized and adjudicated in a court 
of law, their fundamental ability to act as autonomous individuals 
was compromised.57 The law's failure to recognize women's bodily 
integrity similarly has a constitutive effect on selfhood.58 
The need to project an image of bodily integrity is not unique to 
women.59 To retain even the most basic sense of self, human beings 
must have some control over the divide between what is inside and 
what is outside their bodies. The bodily integrity of women, how-
ever, is systematically accorded less respect than that of men. For 
example, in judicial responses to the issue of whether a patient has 
a right to refuse medical treatment, the so-called "right-to-die" 
cases, gender plays a significant role in how the court determines 
the patient's wishes and whether the court follows them.6° Over-
The integrity of my body is undennined in pregnancy not only by this extemality of 
the inside, but also by the fact that the boundaries of my body are themselves in flux. In 
pregnancy I literally do not have a firm sense of where my body ends and the world 
begins. My automatic body habits become dislodged; the continuity between my cus-
tomary body and my body at this moment is broken. 
Iris Marion Young, Pregnant Embodiment, in THROWING LIKE A GmL AND OTHER ESSAYS 
IN FEMINisr PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY [hereinafter THROWING LIKE A GIRL] 160, 
163 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
56. For an excellent exposition of competing theories of personhood, see Radin, supra 
note 47. 
57. Such was the case under the law of coverture, according to which a married woman's 
rights were subsumed by her husband's. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. 
Another example, in the Canadian context, is the Persons case, in which five women chal-
lenged the meaning of the word "persons" in the British North America Act. See In re a 
Reference as to the Meaning of the Word "Persons" in Section 24 of the British N. Am Act, 
1867, (1928) S.C.R. 276 (Can.), revd., Edwards v. A.G. for Canada, (1930] A.C. 129 (P.C.). 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the term did not include women. The Privy Council 
reversed. See Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes, in 
AT TiiE BOUNDARIES OF LAw: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 283, 285-86 (Martha A. 
Fineman & Nancy S. Thomadsen eds., 1991). 
58. "To recognize something as a person is, among other things, to attribute bodily con-
tinuity to it." Radin, supra note 47, at 963. 
59. See generally ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN (1985). 
60. See Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die," 18 
LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 85 (1990). Miles and August conducted a comprehensive 
survey of appellate-level, civil, state "right-to-die" cases involving incompetent adult patients. 
See id. at 85. 
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whelmingly, courts respect the male patients' wishes and do not re-
spect those of female patients.61 An analysis of the language of 
these judgments shows that "men are depicted as subject to a medi-
cal assault; women are depicted as vulnerable to medical neglect."62 
This language suggests that the integrity of male bodies is self-
evident, while intervention in female bodies is expected. 
Tue notion of bodily integrity is particularly complex in the case 
of the pregnant woman. Tue uniqueness of pregnancy has posed 
significant problems for a legal system constructed along a para-
digm of neutrality and devoted to airtight categories.63 Neutrality 
has been defined along androcentric lines, with "male" standing in 
for "human" and, consequently, "female" consigned to alterity.64 
Tue argument that pregnancy is unique, however, should neither 
devalue nor sentimentalize it. Uniqueness only refers to the fact 
that there is no analogous state in men that provides a basis for 
comparison at the immediate level of the physical body.65 Tue 
problem within a system of law that constructs equality along an 
axis of "sameness" is that the uniqueness of pregnancy is un-
derdetermined on the one hand, and overdetermined on the other 
61. For example, in cases involving the construction of the patient's own preference, ter-
mination of life-sustaining treatment was allowed for 75% of men and only 14% of women. 
See id. at 86. 
62. Id. at 89. In addition, the wishes expressed by the patients were characterized accord-
ing to gender. In the case of female patients, courts often viewed such expressions as emo-
tional, unreflective, or immature and thus not sufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating 
clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes. Similar expressions of male patients 
were, however, more often found to be rational and sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary re-
quirements. See id. at 87; see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-
82 (1990) (elaborating on the "clear and convincing evidence" standard). 
63. See Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduc-
tion" and the Law, 13 NovA L. REV. 355, 366 (1989) ("Committed to categorization, law is 
intolerant of porous boundarles (placentas?)."). 
64. See Iris Marion Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public, Some Implications of Femi-
nist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory, in THROWING LIKE A GIRL, supra note 55, at 92. 
Arguably the uniqueness of pregnancy has led courts to devalue it and to fail to apply "equi-
table" standards of review" to restrictions on accessibility. See Gayle Binion, Securing Access 
to Reproductive Choice: Undoing the Undue Burdens, Paper Presented at the Annual Meet-
ing of the Law and Society Association 19 (June 1994) (on file with the author); see also 
Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Work-
place Debate, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 118, 140 (1986) ("The problem is not the uniqueness of 
something like pregnancy, but the view that our legal system has adopted towards 'special' 
human qualities, particularly qualities that are special because they are inherently female in 
the sense that they cannot be experienced by a male."); see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 
98; Katherine T. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. 
REV. 1532 (1974). 
65. See SARA RuomcK, MATERNAL THINKING 49 (1989) ("Whatever the state of tech-
nology, a man engages in no activity that can match, in labor, a woman's pregnancy, with its 
anxieties, discomfort, intrusive testing, painful delivery, and unique excitements and 
pleasures."). But see FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 55 n.3 (providing references claiming that 
technology may be advancing to the point that men could gestate human life). 
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- pregnancy is either denied legal significance or a woman's preg-
nancy becomes the totality of how she is defined. Thus, differential 
treatment on the basis of pregnancy is not illegal sex discrimination 
(as in Geduldig v. Aiello), or the mere potential for pregnancy can 
affect a woman's ability to earn a living (as in UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc.).66 Women have been rendered invisible through the 
construction of their wombs as containers - they themselves have 
been contained through this reduction of self to a maternal func-
tion. 67 Once again, law takes the bodily integrity of men for 
granted and does so in a way that it simply does not for pregnant 
women. As philosopher Susan Bordo observes, 
[O]ntologically speaking, the pregnant woman bas been seen by our 
legal system as the mirror-image of the abstract subject whose bodily 
integrity the law is so determined to protect. ... The essence of the 
pregnant woman, by contrast, is her biological, purely mechanical role 
in preserving the life of another. In her case, this is the given value, 
against which her claims to subjectivity must be rigorously evaluated, 
and they will usually be found wanting insofar as they conflict with 
66. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 
871 (7th Cir. 1989), revd., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); see also Colb, supra note 13, at 106 (discussing 
the concurrent devaluation and denial of women's unique procreative capacities). 
67. See SusAN BoRDo, Are Mothers Persons? Reproductive Rights and the Politics of Sub· 
ject-ivity, in UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 86 
(1993); E. Ann Kaplan, Look Who's Talking Indeed: Fetal Images in Recent North American 
Vtsual Culture, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 26, at 
121. Siegel notes that the emphasis on corporeality and, therefore, science, in Roe distracted 
the Court from any consideration of the socially constructed body: 
The Court addresses reproduction as if it were primarily a physiological process and 
evaluates its regulation in terms focused on the female body. This tendency, which I call 
"physiological naturalism," informs both equal protection law and the analysis of 
abortion-restrictive regulation offered in Roe. Consequently, abortion-restrictive regula-
tion has been evaluated in ways that obscure the social norms that shape women's inter-
ests in abortion, as well as public interest in regulation. 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 265. Contrast the plurality in Casey which admits the relevance of 
the social construction of motherhood in a discussion of abortion: 
(A woman's] suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, 
upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the 
course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a 
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). See also the very nuanced state-
ment in the concurring judgment of Madam Justice Wilson in the Canadian abortion decision 
R. v. Morgentaler, 44 D.L.R.4th 385, 490-91 (Can. 1988): 
This decision (to have an abortion] is one that will have profound psychological, eco-
nomic and social consequences for the pregnant woman. The circumstances giving rise 
to it can be complex and varied and there may be, and usually are, powerful considera-
tions militating in opposite directions. It is a decision that deeply reflects the way the 
woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to society at large. It is 
not just a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as well. Her response 
to it will be the response of the whole person. 
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a dilemma 
not just because it is outside the realm of his personal experience (although this is, of 
course, the case) but because he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminat-
ing the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma. 
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her life-support function. In the face of such a conflict, her valua-
tions, choices, consciousness are expendable.68 
Women's bodily selves have thus been uniquely subject to legal reg-
ulation in the arena of control of their reproductive lives, and there-
fore women are uniquely subject to the disintegratiOJ,1 and loss of 
selfhood that results from this kind of regulation.69 Despite the fact 
that the right to bodily integrity is a longstanding and "sacred" 
one,1° pregnant women have been forced to submit to surgery for 
the benefit of the intrauterine life they carry. As a result, other 
persons can invade the bodily integrity of the woman for the sole 
benefit of the intrauterine life within her.71 This practice occurs de-
spite the fact that family members do not have to undergo surgery 
for one another,72 nor are criminal defendants required to give un-
68. BoRDo, supra note 67, at 79; see also Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
69. For example, reproductive hazards to men are persistently ignored in favor of regulat-
ing women's behavior. See, e.g., Ricardo A. Yazigi et al., Demonstration of Specific Binding 
of Cocaine to Human Spermatowa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991) (linking damage to sperm with 
cocaine use); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other Misconduct 
of Expectant Fathers, 72 OR. L. REv. 901 (1993). 
70. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972): 
The root premise is the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that '[e]very 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body. . . . True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed 
exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the op-
tions available and the risks attendant upon each. 
464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted) (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)), cited in Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 1236 n.134; see Cruzan v. Director, 
. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1990); see also E. v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 
(Can.); Neff, supra note 38, at 328. 
71. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and rehg. granted, 539 A.2d 
203 (D.C. 1988); In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rpt. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), 
cited in Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 1241; Re R., 9 R.F.L.3d 415 (B.C. Prov. Ct. 1987), revd. 
sub nom. Re Baby R., 53 D.L.R.4th 69 (Can. 1988). See discussions in Julia E. Hanigsberg, 
Power and Procreation: State Interference in Pregnancy, 23 OrrAWA L. REv. 35 (1991); 
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered 
Caesareans, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1951 (1986); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory 
and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 1325 (1990). 
72. Doctors must obtain the patient's informed consent to perform surgery and must ob-
tain consent to perform an operation on one family member that will save the life or health 
of another such as skin grafts or bone marrow transplants. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 
1243-44 (D.C. 1990); Christine Overall, Mother/Fetus/State Conflicts, 9 HEALTH L. CAN. 101, 
102 (1989) ("Fetuses are the only group of entities that have been given legal entitlement to 
the medical use of the bodies of adult persons. If we are not willing to authorize compulsory 
blood 'donations' or organ 'donations' to save the lives of dying persons, then we should not 
be willing to tolerate compulsory fetal surgery or cesarean sections .... "); Siegel, supra note 
10, at 342. 
In McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978), discussed in 
Rhoden, supra note 71, at 1977-78, a bone marrow implant was necessary to save the life of 
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limited access to their bodies for the purpose of gathering evi-
dence.73 Women receive unequal treatment when courts and 
legislatures impose their meaning on procreativity and deny them 
the minimum conditions of selfhood by forcing them to have 
babies.74 
Law, as it structures women's procreative choices, disaggregates 
women from their own bodies, fundamentally disrupting women's 
ability to conceptualize their bodily integrity because it is the ability 
to internalize the projection of bodily integrity, to experience one-
self as whole, that is necessary to selfhood.75 In this sense, the de-
nial of procreative autonomy enforces the kind of split that will 
undermine a woman's sense of self because her womb and body are 
no longer hers to control but instead have been turned over to the 
jurisdiction of courts and legislatures.76 When law denies women 
abortions, it imposes on their bodies involuntary pregnancy - and 
by necessary implication, involuntary motherhood. A woman is 
the defendant's cousin. The Court refused to grant a court order requiring it. The Court 
stated: 
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular 
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is 
revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence. Forceable extraction of living 
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the 
swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends. 
10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92; see also In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 {Wis. 1975) 
(refusing to authorize a kidney transplant from an institutionalized mental patient to his sis-
ter). Contra Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972) (using doctrine of substituted judg-
ment to hold that parents of a seven-year old identical twin could authorize a kidney 
transplant necessary to the other twin's survival); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) 
(authorizing kidney transplant from an incompetent ward of the state to his brother); 
Marjorie M. Shultz, Abortion and Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Broadening Our Concerns, 1 S. 
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 79, 87-88 {1992) (arguing that the special relationship be-
tween the pregnant woman and the intrauterine life she carries cannot be analogized to that 
of strangers). 
73. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 {1992) (citing Winston v. Lee 
and Rochin v. California); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 {1985) {holding that a criminal 
defendant does not have to submit to removal of bullet from his body at least on simple 
probable cause because of Fourth Amendment right to "personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that forcibly pumping the 
stomach of a criminal defendant constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ad-
ams v. Indiana, 299 N.E.2d 834, 837 {Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974) {holding 
that removal of bullet would be "an intrusion of the most serious magnitude"); People v. 
Smith, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTI· 
TUTIONAL LAW 1329-37 (2d ed. 1988). 
74. See CORNELL, supra note 38 (manuscript at 57-58); see also BoRDo, supra note 67, at 
94. 
75. See generally CORNELL, supra note 38. 
76. See Neff, supra note 38, at 350 ("From the moment a pregnant woman decides that 
she does not want to carry the pregnancy to term, from the moment she ceases voluntarily to 
participate in the pregnancy, it becomes a pregnancy against her will and a significant bodily 
intrusion. This bodily intrusion is, in effect, state action to commission the womb for use as a 
fetal incubator. The state has entered the woman's body, seized control, and established an 
adversarial relationship between the woman and her womb."). 
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thus denied the necessary conditions of selfhood because she is 
either separated from her womb or reduced to it.77 
Accordingly, the wrong in denying or limiting access to safe and 
affordable abortions is a wrong that prevents the development of 
the minimum conditions necessary for individuation and any mean-
ingful concept of selfhood.78 I do not intend to argue that abortion, 
being merely about autonomy, is a simplistic negative liberty - a 
right to be left alone - or a right to make choices unburdened by 
state interference.79 On the contrary, conditions in which safe abor-
tions are available to women of every race, socio-economic stratum, 
and nationality are an integral requirement of bodily integrity -
and the realization of these conditions may depend upon social ob-
ligations that recognize positive rights.so 
A positive notion of rights that can surmount the sameness-
difference debate,s1 however, will require a resymbolization of sex-
ual difference within the law that neither denies women's sexuality 
nor reifi.es differences that are perceived to be "natural" in order to 
defeat equality claims.82 It is thus important to examine critically 
77. See CORNELL, supra note 38 (manuscript at 21, 28). 
78. Id. (manuscript at 27-28). 
79. See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WoMAN's CHOICE: THE 
STATE, SEXUALITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 382 (rev. ed. 1990) (describing control 
over "whether, when and in what circumstances" to bear children not just as a "libertarian 
'right' " but as a "positive and necessary enabling condition for full human participation in 
social and communal life"). 
80. This has not been mandated under the privacy framework set out by the Supreme 
Court in Roe. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (rejecting constitutional challenges 
to public funding limitations barring payments for most medically necessary abortions); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding law excluding nontherapeutic, medically un-
necessary abortions from a Medicaid-funded program); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991) (upholding restrictions on providing information about abortion in family planning 
clinics that receive public funding); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) (upholding restrictions on the use of public facilities for abortion services); see also 
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Af-
firmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985). 
For a more general discussion of the distinction between positive and negative liberty, see 
the classic exposition by Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR EssAYS ON Lm-
ERTY 118 (1969). According to Berlin, negative liberty is "not being interfered with by 
others," id. at 123, while positive liberty "derives from the wish on the part of the individual 
to be his own master," id. at 131. See also CHARLES FRIED, R.IGHr AND WRONG 110-12 
(1978); David P. Curie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864, 
864-67 (1986); Richard H. Fallon, Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875 (1994). 
81. For a discussion of the sameness-difference debate in feminist legal theory, see 
Martha Minow, Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in CONFLICTS 
IN FEMINISM 149, 151-54 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990). 
82. These views include an argument that the fact that women can become pregnant and 
men cannot is a difference in nature, not law. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding restrictions on working hours for women 
because of their procreative role); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) 
(Bradley, J., concurring) ("The paramount destiny and mission. of woman are to fulfill the 
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how law views these "natural" differences and how law enforces 
them. These processes determine how bodies come to "matter" in 
law because their legal construction shapes their very reality.s3 
II. MOTHERING 
Motherhood is a central but confusing icon within our social struc-
ture. It is at once dominating and dominated, much as mothers are 
both revered and regulated.84 
By envisioning abortion as a mothering decision I explore three 
interconnecting theses. First I make explicit that at least part of the 
reason why the regulation of abortion has proven so intractable le-
gally and politically is because as a cultural phenomenon it has not 
been separated from mothering and relationships between mother 
and child - and perhaps it cannot be, given th~ social and political 
context it occupies. Thus, legal regulation of abortion has been 
steeped in ideological interpretations of motherhood that result in 
women's subordination.85 Second, I reveal that homologizing preg-
nancy and motherhood has been possible because the notion of 
abortion as part of a spectrum of mothering activities resonates 
with many women's experiences.s6 Third, by putting abortion in 
the frame of mothering decisions I include intrauterine life in the 
feminist discussion of abortion and salvage that side of the dis-
course from anti-abortion rhetoric. 87 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother."); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 
(7th Cir. 1989), revd., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
83. See JUDrIH Bun.ER, BoDIES THAT MATIER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 
69-71 (1993). See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 37; JOHN O'NEILL, THE COMMUNICATIVE 
BODY (1989); JOHN O'NEILL, FIVE BODIES: THE HUMAN SHAPE OF MODERN SOCIETY 
(1985); MAURICE MERLEAU PoNTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION {Colin Sinith, 
trans., 1962); SCARRY, supra note 59; BRYAN s. TURNER, THE BODY AND SOCIETY (1984); 
THE FEMALE BODY IN WESTERN CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (Susan Rubin 
Suleiman ed., 1985); PEOPLE OF THE BODY: JEWS AND JUDAISM FROM AN EMBODIED PER· 
SPECTJVE (Howard Eilberg-Schwartz ed., 1992); Axel Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect: 
Principles of a Conception of Morality Based on the Theory of Recognition, 20 PoL. THEORY 
187, 190-93 (1992); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 CoLUM. L. REV, 1431 
(1992). 
84. carol Sanger, Mis for the Many Things, 1 s. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 15, 17 
(1992). She also states that: 
The reverence and regulation are not so much in conflict as in league. The rules reinind 
women of how to behave in order to stay revered. This reverence is something more 
than a fan club for mothers. It matters in such practical and concrete ways as keeping 
one's children, having credibility in court, getting promoted at work, and so on. 
Id. at 17-18. 
85. See infra section II.A. 
86. See infra section H.B. 
87. See infra Part III. The danger in incorporating abortion into other mothering deci-
sions is that I Inight appear to imply that intrauterine life is the same as a child and is the 
focus of other mothering decisions, thus leading to the implication that the intrauterine life 
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Although the abortion question has a fundamental connection 
to issues of body and self, the decision whether to have an abortion 
is also one that generates conflict because it is simultaneously about 
mothering - about connections between the woman making the 
choice and the intrauterine life she carries.ss Like many other 
choices made during pregnancy, abortion generates moral outrage 
because it is conceptualized as bad motherings9 and selfish behav-
ior .9o From the moment a woman becomes pregnant, other persons 
treat her decisions, ranging from whether to ingest alcohol or drugs 
(from aspirin to cocaine), smoke, abide passive ingestion of smoke, 
what to eat, whether to have sex, travel, own a cat, and so on, as 
has the same rights as a child. This, however, is not a necessary conclusion, as I elaborate 
below. 
88. According to Carol Sanger, the privacy framework in Roe, 
necessarily diverted attention from a woman's interest in controlling her post-pregnant, 
child-now-out-of-body life. As abortion became a reproductive rather than a maternal 
issue, the very idea of motherhood became antithetical to a prochoice position instead of 
its essence. But deciding whether or not to have an abortion is making a decision exactly 
about what place motherhood will occupy in one's life. The decision necessarily encom-
passes hard thinking on such questions as when one would become a mother, how often, 
with whom, and what obligations already exist to other children, to a partner, or to 
oneself. 
Sanger, supra note 84, at 23. But see the highly sentimental consideration of motherhood by 
the plurality in Casey: 
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, 
to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the 
human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others 
and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she 
make the sacrifice [of carrying a child to term]. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct 2791, 2807 (1992). 
89. For example, the Assembly sponsor of New York State's alcohol warning statute, 
John Brian Murtaugh, justified the state's decision to warn only pregnant women of the dan-
gers of drinking on the grounds that pregnant women have a "special responsibility" saying: 
"There certainly are other alcohol-related problems you could talk about. But if you put all 
of them on a poster you would dilute the message." Kevin Sack, Unlikely Union in Albany: 
Feminists and Liquor Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at Bl, B4; see also Roberts, Racism 
and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 15 (explaining that Black women who ingest drugs while 
pregnant are being punished for their failure to meet society's image of the ideal mother.); 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 375 & n.447 (recognizing that public outrage directed at pregnant, 
drug-dependent women is a manifestation of a pregnant woman being branded socially-le-
gally as a bad mother). 
For discussions of the notion of "bad mothers," see, for example, Marie Ashe, The "Bad 
Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HAsTINGs L.J. 1017 (1992); 
and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Monster Stories: Women Charged With Perinatal Endanger-
ment, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CuLTURE, supra note 9, 
at 282. 
90. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) ("At the heart 
of the controversy •.. are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the 
life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, are unwanted for any one or more of a 
variety of reasons - convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embar-
rassment of illegitimacy, etc."); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic 
of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.1559, 1572-94 (1991); Moira L. McConnell, Capricious, Whimsi-
cal and Aborting Women: Abortion as a Medical Criminal Issue (Again), 3 CAN. J. WoMEN & 
L. 661 (1989) (book review). 
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mothering choices.91 Suppositions about the special responsibilities 
that women assume as mothers may produce legal responses that 
single out the conduct of pregnant women, thus homologizing the 
states of pregnancy and motherhood.92 It is in these ways that the 
ideology of motherhood - inter alia, the simultaneous idealization 
and demonization of mothers in our culture - is imposed on abor-
tion decisionmaking.93 I do not mean to suggest that the social 
91. See Johnsen, supra note 23, at 585-86 (reporting on government efforts to impose 
criminal or civil sanctions on a range of activities during pregnancy deemed to present some 
risk to intrauterine life including: failing to obtain adequate medical care; not following a 
doctor's advice; choosing vaginal delivery over a cesarian section; failing to eat a balanced 
diet; smoking cigarettes; engaging in sexual intercourse with spouse; being injured in a car 
accident while driving negligently or while intoxicated; taking prescription drugs; and taking 
illegal drugs). Rapp quotes one pregnant woman undergoing genetic counseling: 
Now, I'm not even allowed to pet my cat, or have a glass of wine after a hard day's work. 
I'm supposed to think that three cigarettes a day is what caused my first miscarriage. 
They can see a lot of patterns, but they sure can't explain them. But they talk as if they 
could explain them. I mean, they want you to have a baby by the statistics, not from 
your own lifestyle. 
Rapp, supra note 44, at 38-39. These kinds of restrictions are being enforced despite the fact 
that even the degree of danger of cocaine use during pregnancy has been called into question. 
See Linda C. Mayes et al., The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, A Rush to Judgment, 
267 JAMA 406, 406 (1992) ("Our review of the current literature on the subject [of in utero 
exposure to cocaine] indicates that available evidence from the newborn period is far too 
slim and fragmented to allow any clear predictions about the effects of intrauterine exposure 
to cocaine on the course and outcome of child growth and development."); see also Michelle 
Harrison, Drug Addiction in Pregnancy: The Interface of Science, Emotion, and Social Pol-
icy, 8 J. SUBsrANCE ABusE TREATMENT 261 (1991); Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, 
Drugs and the Perils of Prosecution, CruM. Jusr. Ennes Winter/Spring 1990, at 30. This is 
consistent with persistent errors about the medical treatment of pregnant women. See gener-
ally Hanigsberg, supra note 71, at 50-52 (discussing DES, thalidomide, and the practice of 
"twilight sleep"). 
92. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 347 ("When the state imposes duties of motherhood on 
pregnant women, it employs public power to enforce a gender status role."). 
93. Historian Gerda Lerner defines the "ideology of motherhood" as "its symbolic mean-
ing as defined in particular periods and under different circumstances." GERDA LERNER, 
THE CREATION OF FEMINisr CONSCIOUSNESS 116-17 (1993). In contemporary North Ameri-
can culture, mothers are characterized by their tenderness, willingness to sacrifice, and total 
involvement with their children. See Nancy Chodorow & Susan Contratto, The Fantasy of the 
Perfect Mother, in RETIIINKING 11iE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST QUEsrIONS 54 (Barrie Thorne 
& Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982); cf. Hanigsberg, supra note 71, at 44. These good mothers are 
also White and middle-class. See Eileen Boris, The Power of Motherhood: Black and White 
Activist Women Redefine the "Political," 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 29 (1989); Ikemoto, 
supra note 12, at 1210-11. As Carol Sanger has described it: 
The ideal model is used to determine what conduct by mothers is in some official sense 
"motherly;" that model then becomes the essence of what mothers are about, an un-
stated reference point in the formation of public policy and the application of legal rules. 
For most of this century, the dominant model of motherhood has meant something 
closer to "housewife" - a married, nonworking, inherently selfless, largely nonsexual, 
white woman with children. 
Sanger, supra note 84, at 18. Yet, the figure of the mother is simultaneously demonized: she 
is responsible for anything that goes wrong with the child. For example, the psychiatric pro-
fession blamed both autism and schizophrenia on bad mothering. See Catherine McBride-
Chang et al., Mother-Blaming, Psychology and the Law, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S Sruo. 
69, 71 (1992). When she poses a danger to her child, she is held to a higher standard of care 
than anyone else in society. Cf. Christine Overall, "Pluck a Fetus from Its Womb": A Cri-
tique of Current Attitudes Toward the Embryo/Fetus, 24 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 1, 10 (1986). 
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meaning of motherhood is women's experience of mothering,94 
however, this ideology does influence individual women's exper-
iences of motherhood.95 Contrary to the "ideal," motherhood is 
just as much about fear and danger as it is about self-sacrifice. 
Mothering is work for women and can produce both ecstasy. and 
rage; it can be debilitating and intrusive and a great joy96 - it can 
be done well or badly. Pregnancy brings with it the same range of 
responses. Likewise, while some mothering decisions reflect the 
qualities of the idealized mother, such as self-sacrifice and generos-
ity, at other times decisions stem from the mother's desires and as-
pirations alone totally apart from the child's needs.97 Most of the 
time, mothering decisions fall somewhere in betWeen these two ex-
tremes. I argue that, like other mothering decisions, the abortion 
decision is not exclusively a "selfish" or "irresponsible" choice.98 
For other discussions of issues related to the ideology of motherhood, see FINEMAN, supra 
note 12; E. ANN KAPLAN, MOTHERHOOD AND REPRESENTATION: THE MOTHER IN POPULAR 
CULTURE AND MELODRAMA (1992); RICH, supra note 32; ROTHMAN, supra note 25; SHARI 
L. THURER, THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD: How CULTURE REINVENTS THE GOOD 
MOTHER (1994); MOTHERHOOD: A FEMINIST PERsPECTIVE (Jane Price Knowles & Ellen 
Cole eds., 1990); MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note 26; REP-
RESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. 
Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993); Nancy 
D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 18 GEO. LJ. 459 (1990). 
94. See R1CH, supra note 32; RUDDICK, supra note 65, at 29; Roberts, Racism and Patri-
archy, supra note 24, at 4. 
95. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of 
Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 38 (1990); Siegel, supra note 10, at 272. 
96. See RUDDICK, supra note 65, at xi: 
The conception of mothering as a kind of caring labor undermines the myth that 
mothers are "naturally" loving. There is nothing foreordained about maternal response. 
Birthgivers or legal guardians may respond to children with indifference, assault, or ac-
tive neglect. Nor is there a single emotion-love-that children inspire in mothers. A 
mother's emotions can vary within the course of a day, and certainly vary over time, 
depending on the behavior of her children, the space, time, and services availale to her, 
and myriad other desires and frustrations. Maternal love itself is a mix of many feelings, 
among them: infatuation, delight, fascination, pride, shame, guilt, anger, and loss. 
See, e.g., Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, supra note 24, at 97; Siegel, supra note 10, at 378-
79; West, supra note 68. 
97. See Carol Sanger, Mother From Child: Maternal Decisions to Separate From Chil-
dren 37-38 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (giving as examples of mothers' 
separations from their children springing from the "free-standing desires and preferences of 
the mother herself": separation in order to study, to work, to relax, and simply because they 
do not like being mothers). 
98. For example, in the anti-abortion campaigns in the late-19th century the incidence of 
abortion was attributed to the "growing self-indulgence among American women." JAMES C. 
MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY 1800-
1900, at 108 (1978). As another anti·abortion activist put it, "Have you the right to choose an 
indolent, selfish life, neglecting the work God has appointed you to perform?" AuGusrus 
GARDNER, Physical Decline of American Women, reprinted in CONJUGAL SINS AGAINST THE 
LAws OF LIFE AND HEALTH 199, 225 (1870). A published report of the Ohio Senate special 
committee introducing anti-abortion legislation deplored women who sought abortions as 
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A. The Legal Mother: Homologizing Pregnancy 
and Motherhood 
As I have already begun to elaborate above, the difficulties 
posed by abortion have resulted in part from a lack of separation in 
legal and political discourse between abortion, on the one hand, 
and mothering and relationships between mother and child on the 
other. A statement made in 1991 by Representative Henry Hyde 
on the floor of Congress exemplifies this thesis: "[T]hat tiny little 
atom of humanity surrounded by a wom[a]n called 'mother' is a 
member of the human family .... "99 This comment, like much of 
the rhetoric of abortion and pregnancy more generally, fails to dis-
aggregate motherhood from pregnancy. Examining restrictions of 
abortion in their social framework demonstrates that they represent 
value judgments concerning women as mothers, paralleling a shift 
from legal protection of mothers, to protection of fetuses from their 
"mothers."100 Courts frequently refer to the pregnant woman as a 
mother.101 No rhetorical differentiation is made between the preg-
nant woman's status before and after birth. This kind of language is 
perhaps most blatant in the context of so-called "fetal protection" 
cases, in which a court is called upon to restrict a woman's behavior 
during pregnancy or to intervene forcibly on behalf of the intrauter-
ine life. In such contexts courts have referred to having nothing 
yielding to the "demands of society and fashionable life." 1867 Ohio Sen. J. App. 235. All 
cited in Siegel, supra note 10, at nn.161, 162, 164, & 231. 
This kind of rhetoric is mirrored in the contemporary context. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 
410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (describing Roe as protecting women's right 
to terminate a pregnancy for reasons of "convenience, whim, or caprice" or for "no reason at 
all"); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN .ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANA· 
SIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 32-33 (1993) (discussing the moral quality of the decision to 
have an abortion in order not to have to postpone a vacation trip); see also KRISTIN LUKER, 
ABORTION AND TiiE POLITICS OF MOTIIERHOOD 227 (1984) (citing opinion polls that demon-
strate that Americans disapprove of "casual" abortions); McConnell, supra note 90. On the 
contemporary use of the rhetoric of irresponsibility, see Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irre-
sponsibility, 43 DuKE L.J. 989 (1994). 
99. 137 CONG. REc. H5125 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde), quoted in 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 327 (commenting that "when opponents of abortion call 'that tiny 
little atom of humanity' a 'baby,' and condemn the practice as murder, killing, or the destruc-
tion of human life, they are in fact expressing a moral judgment about a relation between 
mother and child, and condemning women for violating the most fundamental conceptions of 
the maternal role"). 
100. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 265 ("(S]ocial discourses concerning women's roles have 
converged with physiological discourses concerning women's bodies, as two distinct but com-
patible ways of reasoning about women's obligations as mothers."). 
101. For example, in both Roe and Casey the Supreme Court often used the word 
"mother" when referring to a pregnant woman. In Roe, this happened 42 times, while in 
Casey, it occurred 21 times. The following example from Casey illustrates this legerdemain in 
action. In that case, the Court made reference to the pregnant woman as the "mother" carry-
ing the "child" to full-term. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). 
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stand between a fetus and its "mother" but a scalpe1;1°2 they have 
expressed a willingness to infringe upon the "mother's" "wishes" to 
benefit the "child";103 they have described transfusions as being giv-
ing to the"mother" in the case of a women who was 18 weeks preg-
nant;104 and they have described the actions of a pregnant woman 
that a court deemed to be dangerous to the intrauterine life as the 
"mother's" conduct.105 The proposed enactment of a federal child 
abuse statute that would take effect during a woman's pregnancy is 
another manifestation of this tendency to conflate pregnancy and 
motherhood.106 The "logic" of such statutes is that a pregnant 
woman is acting not like, but as an abusive mother during her preg-
nancy, parallel to the logic of prosecutions of parents for child 
abuse in the ordinary scenario. Similarly, prosecutions of drug-
abusing women, compelled medical treatment of pregnant women, 
as well as judicial and political admonitions that their conduct may 
threaten the welfare of the intrauterine life they carry reinforce the 
treatment of pregnancy as already mothering.101 
Although this regulation of behavior during pregnancy is ex-
pressed in race- and class-neutral terms, these court decisions and 
legislative initiatives often rest upon unexamined normative judg-
ments about the mothering of poor and non-White women who 
bear the brunt of these regulations.108 These women, after all, are 
102. See In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986), 
reprinted in In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1259 app. at 1262. 
103. See Jefferson v. Griffin County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (approving 
Super. Ct. order). 
104. See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
105. See In re Troy D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1989). 
106. E.g., Child Abuse During Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1989, S. 1444, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. (1989), cited in Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 1271. 
This kind of legislative initiative is likely a response to the judicial reluctance to apply 
existing child abuse and criminal laws to events that occur during pregnancy. See, e.g., Reyes 
v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914-15 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that child endangering 
statute does not refer to an unborn child or include a woman's alleged drug use during preg-
nancy); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing child 
abuse charges on ground that such application misconstrues the effect of the law and violates 
public policy of preserving family life). 
107. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 329-30; see also George J. Annas, Forced Cesarians: The 
Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS Cm. REP., June 1982, at 16; Janet Gallagher, Pre-Natal 
Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WoMEN's L.J. 9 
(1987); Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1990); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, 
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal 
Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REv. 994 
(1988); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood, supra note 71. 
108. Economically disadvantaged women are subject to greater government scrutiny than 
other mothers because of their reliance on government aid such as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-87 (1991 & Supp. 1995). Martha Fineman 
discusses this as the phenomenon of the "public family." See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 177-
396 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:371 
overwhelmingly the object of state interventions and comprised the 
vast majority of the women who died when abortion was illegal.109 
These women do not conveniently match the figure of the "good 
mother."110 
B. Abortion: Experience and Language 
The legal and political tendency to homologize pregnancy and 
motherhood that I have described is problematic because it pro-
duces legal consequences that hold women to a certain standard of 
motherhood before they have even given birth. When lawmakers 
and courts conceptualize pregnant women as mothers, they will be 
mired in antifeminist, even sometimes misogynistic, conceptions of 
maternity and the ideology of motherhood while making decisions 
about abortion. In other words, the problem is not viewing preg-
nant women as women making mothering decisions per se, but 
ascribing to pregnant women the ideological baggage associated 
with mothering in this culture. This danger can be seen in the 
words of Catholic theologian Bernard Haring: 
If it were to become an accepted principle of moral teaching on moth-
erhood to permit a mother whose life was endangered simply to "sac-
rifice" the life of her child in order to save her own, motherhood 
would no longer mean absolute dedication to each and every child.111 
It is the particular idea of a mother that is superimposed on the 
pregnant woman that makes this statement especially disturbing. In 
describing the contest over the meaning of being a woman, which 
she sees as central to the debate over abortion, Petchesky touches 
on what I have identified as homologizing pregnancy and 
motherhood: 
Because the pregnant woman is Mother, she must be ready to die for 
the fetus. More than the survival of the individual fetus, what is ulti-
mately at stake in the abortion struggle, in this view, is the "moral 
teaching" of motherhood as "absolute dedication." It is the idea of 
98; see also Roberts, supra note 107; Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy, supra note 24, at 32-33. 
For a discussion of administrative and bureaucratic aspects of the distribution of government 
aid, see Lome Sossin, The Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes on the 
Possibilities and Limits of Bureaucratic Engagement, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
(forthcoming 1996). 
109. See DAVIS, supra note 27, at 204 ("In New York, for instance, during the several 
years preceding the decriminalization of abortions in that state, some 80 percent of the 
deaths caused by illegal abortions involved Black and Puerto Rican women." (citing Edwin 
M. Gold et al., Therapeutic Abortions in New York City: A 11venty-Year Review, 55 AM. J. 
PUB, HEALTII 964-72 (1965))). 
110. See Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 1206-09. 
111. PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 344 (quoting Bernard Haring). 
November 1995] Abortion 397 
woman as Mother, and of the fetus as the tie that binds her to ... 
selflessness, that takes precedence over anything else.112 
Prohibition of abortion therefore functions as the mechanism for 
assuring women's subordination because it implies that a woman's 
preeminent purpose and essential nature is to be a mother. Homol-
ogizing pregnancy with motherhood defined as an absolute moral 
and social duty is thus clearly detrimental to women.113 
The political and legal results of elevating pregnancy to mother-
hood are potentially devastating to women because they are likely 
to tie women to an exclusively reproductive role, but thinking about 
pregnancy as mothering, in and of itself, does not have any neces-
sary legal consequences, good or bad. Such a view of pregnancy 
may, indeed, in a helpful manner, bring together the experiences of 
pregnant women and a distinctly feminist vision of procreativity.114 
Although women's bodily integrity is deeply involved in preg-
nancy, pregnancy is not only about women's bodies. To speak only 
in terms of bodily integrity is to miss a key, if not the key element of 
pregnancy. The state of pregnancy entails the ineluctable fact of 
intrauterine life. As Marie Ashe has put it: 
Even to speak of the pre-birth period as one of the mother-child "in-
terdependence' does not begin to do justice to the experiential reality 
of pregnancy as a state of being that is neither unitary nor dual, ex-
actly; a state to which we can apply no number known to us. Preg-
nancy discloses the truth of paradox.115 
Pregnancy is thus fundamentally different from other bodily states 
and challenges the traditional bodily integrity framework described 
in Part I. This challenge is posed by the paradox Ashe describes, 
and also by the present value of intrauterine life, even if that life 
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 345. 
114. Cf. Williams, supra note 90, at 1590 ("This [moral] approach not only makes for 
persuasive rhetoric; it may well provide a more accurate reflection of most women's abortion 
decisions. My sense is that, in the context of most women's lives, the decision to abort is 
made thoughtfully, carefully, with quiet sorrow and moral courage."). The challenge here, 
however, is to be able to articulate this feminist vision of mothering decisions without "essen-
tializing" mothers. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINisr THOUGHT 118 (1991); 
Sanger, supra note 84, at 19 ("By 'maternal essentialism' I mean the belief that the real, true 
'whatness' of women is motherhood."). One danger of this position would seem to be its use 
to rearticulate a vision of women as nothing more than wombs. Such a vision has consistently 
been used to women's detriment The theory that I articulate, however, does not depend in 
its conception on any singular understanding or experience of mothering, nor does it seek as 
a result to relegate women to traditional mothering roles. 
On the notion of "essentialism" in feminist thought, see generally DIANA Fuss, EssEN-
TIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE AND DIFFERENCE (1989); and EuZABETH SPELMAN, 
INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988). 
115. Marie Ashe, Law-Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in Contempt, 
22 NEW ENG. L. RE.v. 521, 551 (1988). 
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represents only the possibility of a child. One does not have to at-
tribute rights to intrauterine life to consider it meaningful.116 Simi-
larly, the fact that one considers such life meaningful does not imply 
that one must restrict access to abortion. 
Women define pregnancy and intrauterine life in myriad 
ways,117 and most individual women seeking abortions are not una-
ware of or indifferent to a consideration of the meaning of in-
trauterine life, contrary to the heavy-handed stereotypes much anti-
abortion rhetoric perpetuates.118 It is for this reason that most 
women do not equate having an abortion with having a tooth or a 
bunion removed, even if the woman is entirely sure of her deci-
sion.119 Women do distinguish between children and intrauterine 
life, but they also distinguish between intrauterine life and mere 
parts of their own bodies.120 This distinction helps to explain why, 
at least for many women, abortion can be expressed as a mothering 
decision.121 
116. This is not to eschew the importance of rights or the gains achieved under their 
banner. Rather, rights rhetoric is not the only discourse within which to discuss procreation. 
See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860 
(1987); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. Sruo. 1 
(1993); Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. 
REv. 387 (1984); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives 
From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589 (1986); Janet Farrell Smith, Rights· 
Conflict, Pregnancy, and Abortion, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERSPEcnVES ON 
WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 265 (Carol C. Gould ed., 1984); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 
(1987). 
117. See Rapp, supra note 44, at 34; infra text accompanying note 139. 
118. Anti-abortion activists routinely call those who favor liberal access to abortion 
"baby murderers." See, e.g., Diane Hirth, Pensacola Haunted by History of Violence in Abor-
tion Debate, SUN SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE), July 23, 1995, at lA; Ed Vulliamy, ls Abor-
tion Washington's New Vietnam?, OTTAWA CmzEN, Mar. 4, 1995, at B2. 
119. Marie Ashe has commented upon this over-simplification in pro-choice rhetoric: 
I have been struck ... by the absence from most "pro-choice" rhetoric of a discourse of 
death as well as of discourses of horror and guilt. Pro-life advocates have accurately 
recognized in pro-choice discourse a practice of abstraction that tends to obliterate or to 
erase the realities of bloodiness and violence attached to abortion. Women who con-
sciously experience abortion become familiar with those realities and respond variously 
to them; women whose anaesthetized experiences of abortion distance us from aware-
ness of the bloody violence of abortion sometimes discover in post-abortion experiences 
reminders of the death-dealing power that is exercised in abortion. Both kinds of recog-
nition - that occurring during the course of abortion and that arising later - may 
evoke a range of differing responses in different women. 
Ashe, supra note 63, at 371-72. 
120. See PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 331 ("[M]any •.. ground their practical morality 
about abortion in the real relations in which the necessity for abortion arises. This is the 
often inchoate, unarticulated perspective I refer to as 'moral praxis'. ..• "); Siegel, supra note 
10, at 350 ("An individual woman deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy will evaluate 
the morality of that act in light of her obligations to herself and others, including the unborn 
.... "). 
121. It is worth pointing out a "chicken and egg" problem. The value placed on intrauter-
ine life by women is not unrelated to the value placed on it by law and other influential 
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In this section I provide some examples of first-person narra-
tives that may help to illustrate how the abortion decision can be 
conceptualized within a continuum of mothering decisions.122 Un-
like the discussion in Part I, which focussed on women's bodily in-
tegrity and the connection between women's selfhood and their 
ability to control the abortion decision, these examples suggest a 
contextualized approach to abortion decisionmaking. 
* * * 
Anti-abortion protesters, as part of their clinic protest strategy, 
"educate" pregnant women seeking abortions by showing them pic-
tures of "preborns," or bottles containing the products of abortions 
regulatory (broadly speaking) structures, for example, government and the media. The anti-
abortion movement has expended enormous energy ensuring that women will think of in-
trauterine life as valuable in a specific way. See CoNDrr, supra note 3, at 79-95. Sociologist 
Lynn Chancer has questioned whether "abortions and fetuses are merely floating signifiers, 
an occasion for projecting and displacing a host of cultural contradictions onto a symbolic 
terrain." Lynn S. Chancer, Abortion Without Apology, in FROM .ABORTION TO REPRODUC. 
TIVE FREEDOM: TRANSFORMING A MOVEMENT 113, 114 (Marlene Gerber Fried ed., 1990). 
Technology has also provided us all with unprecedented access to intrauterine life. The 
value of this life has certainly evolved. Where once quickening - the moment a pregnant 
woman first feels the intrauterine life move - might have marked the moment that a woman 
considered herself pregnant, now this moment can be marked as early as the day after men-
ses was expected by a blue line on a pregnancy test stick in a woman's own bathroom. Thus, 
for example, the notion of value in early intrauterine life and women's experience of grief in 
terminating such life may be a very recent phenomenon related to technological advances. 
See generally Women's Legal Education and Action Fund, Intervenor's Factum at para. 32, 
R. v. Sullivan 63 C.C.C.3d 97 (Can.); RABBI HA.YIM HALEVY DoNIN, To BE A JEW 140-41 
(1972) (explaining that traditional Jewish law does not regard intrauterine life as a living soul 
until birth, although its status as "potential life" - after the fortieth day, before which it is 
"mere water" - means that there are conditions on its destruction); BARBARA DUDEN, DIS-
EMBODYING WOMEN: PERSPEcnVES- ON PREGNANCY AND THE UNBORN (1993); ANN 
OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WoMB ch. 7 (1984); Constance Backhouse, Involuntary Mother-
hood: Abortion, Birth Control and the Law in Nineteenth Century Canada, 3 WINDSOR Y.B. 
OF ACCESS TO JUST. 61, 79 (1983) (noting the historical prevalence of infanticide and thus the 
changing perception of the status of even an infant's life); Shelley A.M. Gavigan, On "Bring-
ing on the Menses": The Criminal Liability of Women and the Therapeutic Exception in Cana-
dian Abortion Law, 1 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 279 (1986) (discussing the significance of 
technological advances as they relate to abortion); Rosalind P. Petchesky, Fetal Images: The 
Power of Vzsual Culture in the Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263 (1987); Rapp, 
supra note 44, at 37-39. 
Outsider women - women of color, poor women, and lesbians - may be particularly 
affected by this "chicken-egg" problem. Because of cultural, religious, and other differences, 
outsider women may be more likely to value intrauterine life differently than the law does. 
Simultaneously, the law may have even greater impact on their lives because their value 
differences may lead them to act in violation of the law more often than would women whose 
values are more in concert with those expressed by law. See Letter from Lisa Ikemoto to 
Julia E. Hanigsberg (April 27, 1995) (on file with author). 
122. Such accounts are epistemologically useful because the explanatory potential of 
moral and political theory depend upon their having a basis in reliable knowledge of human 
experience. For discussions of the usefulness and dangers of first-person narratives, see 
Ashe, supra note 115, at 526; Lorraine Code, Experience, Knowledge, and Responsibility, in 
WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST PmLOSOPHY 157 (Ann 
Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989). See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 
79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (examining the emergence of feminist narrative scholarship). 
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preserved in formaldehyde, and displaying messages such as "Abor-
tion Kills Children."123 But women do not need to be told that they 
are making life and death choices - they already know it. As one 
scholar has stated, "[a]bortion is not merely a 'moral' - but also a 
'mortal' decision."124 This understanding of the life and death na-
ture of the abortion decision comes across in the comments of a 
counselor in an abortion clinic discussing her role in the abortion 
decision: 
[Y]es, life is sacred, but the quality of life is also important, and it has 
to be the determining thing in this particular case. the quality of that 
mother's life, the quality of an unborn child's life - I have seen too 
many pictures of babies in trash cans and that sort of thing, and it is so 
easy to say, "Well either/or," and it just isn't like that. And I had to 
be able to say, "Yes, this is killing, there is no way around i~ but I am 
willing to accept that, but I am willing to go ahead with it, and it's 
hard."125 
Similarly, one person quoted by Kristin Luker underscores the fact 
that "pro-choice" advocates do not necessarily deny that the "f e-
tus" is a potential human life: "I take the idea of ending the life of 
the fetus very, very gravely. I'm troubled by that, but this doesn't in 
any way diminish my conviction that a woman has the right to do 
123. See United States v. Terry, 17 F.3d 575, 576 (2d Cir. 1994) (Randall Terry of Opera-
tion Rescue confronted then-Governor Bill Clinton and Senator Al Gore with "fetal re-
mains" during the Democratic National Convention in New York); Verlyn Klinkenborg, 
Violent Certainties: A Report From a Milwaukee Abortion Clinic, Where the Crowd Outside 
Brandishes the Weapons of Righteousness and the Women Inside Bear the Weight of Their 
Choice, HARPERS, Jan. 1995, at 37, 42. 
124. Ashe, supra note 63, at 372. 
125. CAROL GillIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 58 (1982) (emphasis added). A discussion of the merits of Gilli-
gan's study exceeds the scope of this paper. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABm, SrrUATINO nm 
SELF. GENDER, COMMUNITY, AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 148-77 
(1992); MAcKINNoN, supra note 38, at 38-39; SusAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND nm 
FAMILY 15 (1989); Linda K. Kerber et al., On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary 
Forum, 11 SIGNS 304 (1986); Isabel Marcus et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the 
Law: A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); Carol B. Stack, Different Voices, Different 
Vzsions: Gender, Culture, and Moral Reasoning, in UNCERTAIN TERMS: NEOOTIATINO GEN-
DER IN AMERICAN CULTURE, supra note 9, at 19; Joan C. Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference 
to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644 (1987); Williams, supra note 90. On the widespread use of 
Gilligan's work by feminist legal theorists, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing Women Not 
Being Heard: On Carol Gilligan's Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 33 (1994). I am not using Gilligan's work for the purpose of adopting her 
position on moral women or in order to assert that women reason differently from men. I 
only wish to use some of the examples of the ways that the women in her abortion study 
characterized their own feelings about the complexity of their abortion decisions. 
For other first-person accounts of abortion, see COLKER, supra note 5, at 43-57; KRISTIN 
LUKER, TAKING CHANCES: ABORTION AND nm DECISION NOT TO CONTRACEPT (1975); 
KATHLEEN McDONNELL, NOT AN EASY CHOICE: A FEMINIST RE-EXAMINES ABORTION 
(1984); THE CHOICES WE MADE: 25 WOMEN AND MEN SPEAK OUT ABOUT ABORTION (An-
gela Bonovoglia ed., 1991); Lynn Paltrow, Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 3 (1986). 
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that . . . . "126 The abortion decision can be made within a frame-
work of altruism and respect for intrauterine life. For example, a 
nineteen-year-old trying to decide whether to have a second abor-
tion when both her family and her lover opposed continuing the 
pregnancy. For her, the abortion became an act of altruism compli-
cated by sacrificing the "fetus" in order to satisfy other's wants.121 
Another example of this reasoning is the story of a twenty-four year 
old Catholic woman who became pregnant two months after having 
her first child. She characterized her reasons for wanting the abor-
tion as a combination of selfish and responsible ones, noting that 
another pregnancy would strain both the emotional and financial 
resources of the family and would be contrary to medical advice: 
It is taking a life. Even though it is not formed, it is the potential, and 
to me it is still taking a life. But I have to think of mine, my son's, and 
my husband's [lives]. And at first I thought it was for selfish reasons, 
but it is not. I believe that, too, some of it is selfish. I don't want 
another one right now; I am not ready for it .... [But I cannot be] so 
morally strict as to hurt three other people with a decision just be-
cause of my moral beliefs.128 
This description illustrates the difficulty in determining whether a 
solution that involves an abortion is selfish or self-sacrificing. This 
complexity is further illustrated by another woman's decision: 
although this woman felt that the responsible course of action 
would be to continue her pregnancy and that it would be irresponsi-
ble and selfish to have an abortion, she also realized that deciding 
to bear the child might be a way to assuage her guilt and thus the 
selfish thing to do in the circumstances. Faced with alternatives 
each of which might be construed as serving either others or herself, 
she was unable to determine which course of action would be the 
self-sacrificing and therefore the "good" one. She concludes that 
126. Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Meaning of Life, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING 
DIFFERENCES 25, 41 (Sidney Callahan & Daniel Callahan eds., 1984) (emphasis added); see 
also Olsen, supra note 7, at 131-32 (rebutting the anti-abortion argument that widespread 
legal abortion would "dehumanize" society by arguing that "pro-choice" advocates view the 
"fetus" as sharing humanity, yet still advocate that women have a right to choose abortion). 
Olsen emphasizes that women do not want to have abortions but will sometimes feel that 
abortions offer the best solution when their personal situations present only bad alternatives. 
She further suggests that the criminalization of abortion denies women the opportunity to 
express the ambivalence and grief they sometimes feel as a result of terminating a pregnancy. 
Id. at 124. 
127. See GILUGAN, supra note 125, at 80. 
128. Id. at 83-84. 
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no solution will meet the standard of not hurting anyone, and that 
she therefore has no "right" choice to make.129 
In its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians, 130 the National Abortion Rights 
Action League attempted to demonstrate to the Court "the realities 
of abortion in women's lives."131 One story the group shared con-
tained the following statement that reflects concerns based in the 
intersecting relationships in which the woman in question found 
herself: 
I am a junior in college and am putting myself through because my 
father has been unemployed and my mother barely makes enough to 
support the rest of the family. I have promised to help put my 
brother through when I graduate next year and it's his turn .... There 
is no way I could continue this pregnancy because of my responsibili-
ties to my family.132 
In a Canadian case in which a biological father sought by injunc-
tion to prevent his former girlfriend from getting an abortion,133 the 
"mother," Chantal Daigle, expressed her reasons for wanting the 
abortion in the following terms: "I do not wish to have a child at 
the present time in light of my age, my social situation as a single 
person and my moral values as I want to provide for a child in a 
serene stable family environment in which there is no violence 
"134 
Feminist journalist Katha Pollitt, who is adamantly pro-choice, 
has written of her own pregnancy: 
129. See id. at 117-18. Although she decided that to have the abortion would be the best 
decision in her situation, she realized that given different circumstances the decision could 
have gone the other way. See id. 
130. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
131. Amicus Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action league, Thornburg v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 & 84-1379), 
quoted in Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1635 {1987). 
132. Id. at 1637; see also West, supra note 68, at 29-33 (describing the quandaries of 
others mentioned in the brief). 
133. See Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.). 
134. The "violence" she mentions refers to her abuse at her boyfriend's hands. See [1989] 
2 S.C.R. at 537. The Quebec Court of Appeal characterized Daigle's reasons for wanting the 
abortion as unreasonable, meaning that for her to have had an abortion would have been an 
abus de droit (abuse of law). The Court of Appeal went on to find that the balance of con-
venience favored the "fetus" and upheld the injunction. Tremblay v. Daigle, 59 D.L.R.4th 
609 (Que. Ct. App. 1989). Although on summer recess at the time, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held an emergency hearing and unanimously vacated the injunction that day, with 
written reasons following several months later. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. at 530. Ms. Daigle, by 
the time of the Supreme Court's hearing, had already fled to have an abortion in the United 
States, thereby risking being held in contempt of court. At the time of her abortion, she was 
some twenty-two weeks pregnant See Martha Shaffer, Foetal Rights and the Regulation of 
Abortion, 39 McGILL LJ. 58, 60 n.8 (1994). 
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Now, why do I follow my doctor's advice: swill milk, take vita-
mins, eschew alcohol, cigarettes, caffeine, dental X-rays and even the 
innocent aspirin? And why, if I had to, would I do a lot more to help 
my baby to be born healthy, including things that are uncomfortable 
and wearisome (like staying in bed for months, as a friend of mine 
had to) or even detrimental to my own body (like fetal surgery)? It's 
not because I want to tum out a top-of-the-line product, or feel a 
sense of duty to the baby's dad, or have invested the baby with the 
rights and privileges of an American citizen whose address just hap-
pens to be my uterus. I do it because I love the baby. Even before 
it's born, I'm already forming a relationship with it. You can call that 
biology or social conditioning or an emotional fantasy. Perhaps, like 
romantic love, it is all three at once. But it's part of what pregnancy is 
- just ask the millions of pregnant women who feel this way, often to 
their own astonishment .... 13s 
These examples help to illustrate how the abortion decision is a 
kind of mothering decision, as women decide when, whether, and 
with whom to bear children.136 Unlike a common anti-abortion po-
sition, which assumes that women are not considering intrauterine 
life in making their decisions,137 putting abortion within this frame-
135. KATHA POLUIT, REASONABLE CREATURES: EsSAYS ON WOMEN AND FEMINISM 75 
(1994). Some women name the intrauterine life while in utero, especially if they know its sex; 
this practice can be seen as part of this same process of developing a relationship. 
136. See Sanger, supra note 97 (manuscript at 44). As I have tried to be, Sanger is careful 
to specify that "an abortion is still not a separation from a child," and she notes that she does 
not "want to confuse separations from children with separations from fetuses, zygotes, or 
eggs, especially when the political rhetoric of reproduction stands ready and willing to iden-
tify these entities as persons, patients, children, the bearers of rights." 
Id. 
137. See Mary C. Segers, Abortion and the Culture: Toward a Feminist Perspective, in 
ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES, supra note 126, at 229, 240-41: 
fThe] fear[] of casual abortion for selfish reasons may derive from the most deadly anti-
woman bias of them all, namely: that unless women are carefully controlled they will kill 
their own progeny without reason because they are not fully rational creatures. . .. 
[P]regnancy terminations are rarely undertaken lightly, frivolously, or casually ..•. 
[A]bortions are never chosen "for convenience' sake" but are undertaken "in necessity 
and sorrow" and in many cases with considerable ambivalence. 
(citation omitted); see also Overall, supra note 93, at 10 (arguing that women's bodies have 
traditionally been regarded as dangerous places and that now they are seen as dangerous to 
the intrauterine life because the pregnant woman cannot be trusted not to abuse it, not to 
pass defective genes to it, to protect it from environmental harm, and to give birth safely); 
Siegel, supra note 10, at 274 (noting the "criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of 
feminine experience"). 
The same fear seems evident in the framing of responsibility for the abortion decision in 
Roe. In that case, the abortion right is framed as a right protecting a physician's justified 
medical decision, rather than a trust in women's competence to make reproductive decisions. 
As the Roe Court stated: 
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment ac-
cording to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests 
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion deci-
sion in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsi-
bility for it must rest with the physician. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973). For an interesting comparison between society's 
view of birth and technological advances, see Martin, supra note 9. 
404 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:371 
work of mothering decisions suggests what is often the complexity 
of the "choice" not to become a mother.13s This point must not, 
however, be overstated. As at least one legal scholar has observed, 
women say that they are going to have a baby when they are preg-
nant, rather than that they have one, acknowledging that what they 
carry is potential only - an early stage in the project of having a 
child.139 In the early stages of their pregnancies some women do 
not conceptualize the intrauterine life as a "baby" at all. Rayna 
Rapp's ethnography of women undergoing genetic counseling in 
New York City quotes several Latinas whose descriptions used, in 
Rapp's words, "nontechnological imagery."140 
Cultural as well as ethnic differences affect how women value 
pregnancy and intrauterine life. The particular ways in which 
women express such values may be a result of numerous factors 
that include: women's own subjective appreciations of the value of 
intrauterine life; the way that abortion has been politicized as a 
mothering decision;141 the socialization of girls and women to use 
138. Cf. Hester Lessard, Relationship, Particularity and Change: Reflections on R. v. 
Morgentaler and Feminist Approaches to Liberty, 36 McGILL LJ. 263 (1991). 
139. See Greschner, supra note 9, at 649-50 (discussing the grammatical fonn used by 
pregnant women); William Ruddick, Parents and Life Prospects, in HAVING CHILDREN: 
PIIlLOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON p ARENTHOOD 124 (Onora O'Neill & William 
Ruddick eds., 1979) (describing the gradual way that children become "distinct beings"). Of 
course, use of language is not detenninative either. The language in which women speak 
about pregnancy, procreation, and abortion is not itself value-neutral, so women may not 
have the communicative capacity to describe fully a truly woman-centered view of abortion 
- or, for that matter, pregnancy. See Greschner, supra note 9, at 647 (advocating develop-
ment of a new vocabulary and a willingness to hear women speak their experience); see also 
Ashe, supra note 115; Ashe, supra note 63, at 358; Marie Ashe, Conversation and Abortion, 
82 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1988) (book review): 
The current public discourse regarding [menstruation, pregnancy, abortion, childbirth, 
lactation, and the suffering of rape] ... has been dominated by male perspectives and 
male definitions. Women have only recently begun to make ourselves heard, challenging 
dominant and traditional understandings, giving new accounts - in our own words - of 
the significance for female personhood of uniquely female experiences. As women 
speak more fully and listen to one another more attentively, what we often discover is 
the plurality of our voices - a reality demonstrating that, indeed, there is no essential 
"Woman." That reality, the rhythm and tone of plural speech, has created what often 
seems a dissonance in the public discourse. 
Id. at 387-88 (footnotes omitted). 
140. See Rapp, supra note 44, at 34. These women are all Spanish-speaking, and Rapp 
characterizes them by their "relative autonomy from technological imagery ..• due as much 
to having recently emigrated from countries and regions where hospital-based prenatal care 
is both less common and less authoritative, as to anything inherently 'Hispanic.'" Id.; see 
also DUDEN, supra note 121, at 25-29. 
141. See supra section II.A. 
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maternal or caring frameworks in decisionmaking;142 and the perva-
sive effect of technology in framing the experience of pregnancy.143 
In asserting that a number of social forces affect a woman's 
abortion decision, I am not arguing that there is only one individual 
experience of abortion that takes the form of a tortured decision by 
a woman who makes her moral choices by analyzing all the respon-
sibilities and interests at stake.144 Nor can I agree with the view of 
one midwestern doctor that, "[t]here is only one reason I've ever 
heard for having an abortion: the desire to be a good mother."145 
Among the many reasons women give for having an abortion, some 
could be interpreted as conforming to the anti-abortion stereotype 
of the abortion-seeker as a selfish, self-indulgent, promiscuous 
woman, irresponsibly and thoughtlessly having an abortion.146 For 
example, Peggy Noonan, a White House speech writer in the 
Reagan administration, has written about her view when she was a 
college student that abortion was "no more than a surgical proce-
dure. "147 Feminist author Barbara Ehrenreich has said, "Would I 
feel comfortable getting rid of a fetus in the first few months of its 
life? Yes, indeed ... [a]nd I have done it without qualm."148 Some 
women use abortion as birth control and other women have multi-
ple abortions. These examples might appear to be less about moth-
ering in the way that I have been discussing it and perhaps more 
tied to the primacy of sexual freedom or other values, yet these two 
142. See, e.g., CATIIARINE A. MAcl<INNoN, TOWARD A FEMINIST T:HEORY OF THE STATE 
51-52 (1989). 
143. See supra note 121. 
144. See Ashe, supra note 63, at 378-39 (describing accounts of abortion that express 
relief rather than grief as their prevailing emotion); Petchesky, supra note 121, at 271 
(describing the enormous range of women's reactions to abortion suggested by recent re-
search). To do so would be both to essentialize the abortion experience as well as to posit a 
"good mother" model of the abortion-seeker. Such a distillation of experience is bound to be 
unreliable. See Sanger, supra note 84, at 31 (arguing that "attempts at distilling all women 
into mothers and all mothers into good ones are bound to be unreliable"). 
145. Elizabeth Karlin, An Abortionist's Credo: I try to educate my patients and withstand 
my opponents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, (Magazine), at 32 (emphasis added). 
146. See generally Williams, supra note 90, at 1578-79 {discussing negative stereotypes of 
women and teenage girls who have abortions). 
147. She's Come for an Abortion. What Do You Say?, HARPERS, Nov. 1992, at 51-52, 
cited in DwoRKIN, supra note 98, at 32. 
148. Jason DeParle, Beyond the legal right; why liberals and feminists don't like to talk 
about the morality of abortion, WASH. MoNTiiLY, Apr.1989, at36. See also one of the many 
accounts offered to the Court in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986): "On the ride home from the clinic, the relief was enormous. I 
felt happy for the first time in weeks. I had a future again. I had my body back." Amicus 
Brief for the National Abortion Rights Actions League, Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-498 & 84-1379), quoted in 
Ashe, supra note 63, at 379. 
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concerns are not mutually exclusive, for restrictions on abortion are 
also a means to control women's sexuality.149 This possibility does 
not, however, stop these abortions from being homologized into 
mothering. The stereotype of women obtaining abortions that I 
have described here draws its force from the fact that these women 
will be treated not as irresponsible women, but as irresponsible 
mothers, and as a consequence are subject to much harsher moral 
- as well as legal - sanction. 
In short, the argument that I have made is that the fact that law 
and political discourse homologize motherhood and pregnancy may 
be facilitated by the fact that for many women the abortion decision 
falls within the spectrum of mothering decisions, but my argument 
does not rely on all women feeling this way. Moreover, all abor-
tion-seekers, whether or not their experience of abortion suggests 
mothering, remain within the framework of motherhood imposed 
on the abortion decision, and suffer from the ideological constraints 
this implies. Abortion-seekers become framed as "bad mothers." 
As a result, homologizing abortion to motherhood narrows the 
legal system's analysis of the range of procreative choices, including 
abortion. 
III. ACCOUNTING FOR INTRAUTERINE LIFE: 
MEANING AND POLICY 
Part and parcel of the acknowledgment of abortion as a mother-
ing choice is a consideration of the value of intrauterine life. How-
ever one tries to define the different ways that women value that 
life, acknowledging it is critical to a theoretical framework of abor-
tion.150 It is the fact that abortion is not uniquely about the woman 
that the Roe court, albeit inadequately, tried to address with its con-
troversial trimester framework.151 By allowing the "pro-life" side 
149. See, e.g., PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 242-52. 
150. Ronald Dworkin, for example, uses the notion of the "sacred" or "intrinsic impor-
tance." See DwoRKIN, supra note 98, at 71-84. In his view: "The great majority of people 
who have strong views about abortion - liberal as well as conservative - believe, at least 
intuitively, that the life of a human organism has intrinsic value in any form it takes, even in 
the extremely undeveloped form of a very early, just-implanted embryo." Id. at 69. Jean 
Cohen states, "[I]n the case of abortion, the moral issue of the value of fetal life and when it 
begins must be addressed (implicitly or explicitly) by the Court in the process of adjudica-
tion." Cohen, supra note 5, at 73. She herself, however, fails to theorize adequately the 
meaning of this life, relying instead on Dworkin's framework, while simultaneously distanc-
ing herself from it, which she appears to find thought-provoking if not entirely convincing. 
Id. at 78-82; see also Williams, supra note 90, at 1591 ("The subtext of pro-choice stories 
needs to be that pro-choice forces share with their opponents a reverence for human life."). 
151. In Roe, the Court held that because a woman's right to have an abortion is funda-
mental, only a compelling state interest can justify impinging in any way upon that right. In 
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of the abortion debate, and more specifically the religious right 
in the United States, to monopolize discussions of "life," feminists 
have ceded both the moral high ground and the discursive frame-
work of the abortion question.152 To combat the anti-abortion 
movement, even as a strategic question, the "pro-choice" move-
ment needs to display a moral vision rather than depend on abstract 
individual rights.153 The apparent dichotomization, which equates 
anti-abortion forces with concern for "life," and "pro-choice" forces 
with indifference to it, is an obvious and damaging over-
simplification.154 
the first trimester, therefore, the state may only require that an abortion be performed by a 
licensed physician. During the second trimester, the compelling state interest in the mother's 
health permits it to adopt reasonable regulations to ensure safe abortions. In the third tri-
mester, once the intrauterine life is, according to the Roe Court, viable, the state interest in 
preserving the intrauterine life becomes compelling. The state may therefore proscribe abor-
tions during the third trimester except when necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-64 (1973); see also TRIBE, supra note 73, at 1341-42. The 
Court has subsequently retreated from the trimester framework. See Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811, 2817-18 (1992); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. 
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
152. See Ashe, supra note 63, at 372: 
The failure of pro-choice discourse to so recognize it - to acknowledge the violence 
intrinsic to abortion - has constructed impediments to our speaking truly and deeply -
and more variously - of what abortion means to us. It has discouraged our discoveries 
- beneath rhetoric and sloganeering, and beneath the obfuscation of medico-legal dis-
course - of the reality of common bodily experience underlying the various interpreta-
tions of different women. 
153. See, e.g., Larry Letich, Abortion: Bad Choices, in TIKKUN ANTHOLOGY 264, 265 
(Michael Lerner ed., 1992): 
"Reproductive freedom" and "the right to choice" are rejected by many Americans be-
cause these slogans seem to emphasize the primacy of the individual and neglect other 
moral considerations. Sadly, these phrases conjure up a vision of self-indulgence and 
selfishness, which leads many Americans to think that those who favor choice are insen-
sitive to other moral concerns. 
See also Carole Jaffee, The Moral Vision of the Pro-Choice Movement: A Response to Ruth 
Anna Putnam, TIKKUN, Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 82 (arguing that abortion involves moral decision-
making); Shultz, supra note 72, at 81 ("However understandable and tempting it may be, 
uncritical embrace of extreme autonomy rhetoric and of exclusively woman-regarding posi-
tions seems to me to undermine our persuasiveness, to render us vulnerable on grounds of 
principle, and to damage our aspirations for a humane and responsible world."); Williams, 
supra note 90, at 1585-89 (addressing, as a strategic issue, the necessity for pro-choice rheto-
ric to move away from simple notions of autonomy and acknowledge that "the American 
public has bonded with the fetus"). 
Feminists have arguably also ceded both the symbol and experience of motherhood as it 
relates to abortion to the anti-abortion camp. See Sanger, supra note 84, at 23-24 (citing 
Rushworth M. Kidder, Marriage in America: Staking Out High Ground in "Pro-Family" De-
bate, CHRISTIAN So. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 1985, at 25). 
154. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 78; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equal-
ity Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1316 (1991) (describing the fetus as a "form of life," 
"[m]ore than a body part but less than a person"); Siegel, supra note 10, at 348-49. Paradoxi-
cally, the most fanatical wing of the anti-abortion movement calls into question the "life" 
framework by its acts of violence against abortion providers. See CoNDIT, supra note 3; 
Tamar Lewin, Abortion Providers Attempt to Handle Growing Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 
1994, at AB; Mireya Navarro, Jury Recommends Death Penalty for Abortion Foe Convicted in 
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Yet, because the anti-abortion side of the debate does most of 
the talking about the value of intrauterine life, it has assumed, un-
challenged, the power to articulate the consequences of the value of 
such life, while feminists have been left to take a defensive and re-
sponsive posture. What has not been sufficiently expounded is a 
feminist vision of the value of intrauterine life. I argue that the cur-
rent problem is not that intrauterine life has too much status, but 
that it has an insufficiently articulated meaning, and the meaning 
that intrauterine life does have, by virtue of who has ascribed that 
meaning, is not examined for gendered implications and implica-
tions about women as mothers. 
One can see the value of intrauterine life as falling along a con-
tinuum. As I stated in Part II, it is common for pregnant women to 
think about the intrauterine life they carry as a "child." The sense 
of the "child-ness" of the intrauterine life may often originate with 
quickening - when a woman first feels movement. The moment of 
quickening is important also because it is a marker that only the 
woman perceives without mediation, rather than by technology that 
"reveals" the contents of a woman's womb to her. Historically it 
was the socially (and legally)155 relevant moment that established 
the fact of pregnancy - and women's self-image as pregnant - in 
contrast to today, when this moment is more likely to be exper-
ienced looking at a home pregnancy test or in a doctor's office.156 
The sense of connection to a "child" or "baby" usually becomes 
greater the closer the pregnant woman is to term. The possibility 
that is this intrauterine life is the measure of its value. As a possible 
child, it is not valued in the way we value full human life. Thus, for 
example, most North Americans do not mark a miscarriage with a 
funeral in the way we do the death of a person.157 The value 
2 Killings in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at A20; Canada Tightens Security at Abortion 
Clinics After a Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A6. Interestingly, there is a move-
ment for a "Consistent Ethic of Life" among Catholics and Protestants who are firmly op-
posed to any kind of abortion. This ethic entails that people who oppose abortion must show 
consistent respect for human life in other contexts by opposing the death penalty, working 
toward promoting welfare policies that will improve human life, and so on. See JosEPH 
CARDINAL BERNARDIN, THE CONSISTENT Ennc OF LIFE (1988). 
155. See 1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125 ("Life is the immediate gift of 
God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as 
soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb."). On the history of the role of quick-
ening in abortion law, see MoHR, supra note 98, at 4, and Backhouse, supra note 121, at 69. 
156. See DUDEN, supra note 121, at 80. On the iconography of quickening, see generally 
id. at 78-82. Duden notes that the concept of quickening has been eliminated by scientific 
advancement and dropped from English usage. See id. at 80 (quoting BERNARD N. 
NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA 206 (1979)). 
157. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 79 n.114. A number of states, however, have enacted 
fetal remains laws that place special requirements on the disposal of the products of abortion. 
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ascribed to the intrauterine life also becomes greater further into 
the pregnancy, with later term abortions dramatically less common 
and generally causing more moral conflict.158 But this continuum of 
value probably is not unique to the period of pregnancy. It may be 
that although we intuitively feel that a miscarriage is tragic, and 
arguably feel that more when a miscarriage occurs closer to term, 159 
we also may intuitively feel that the death of a two-month old child 
is worse. Moreover, we may consider the death of a teenager 
"worse" than a stillbirth, while one can also consider the death of a 
very elderly person less tragic than the death of a younger adult. 
As these examples illustrate, the mere existence of "life" may not 
be decisive as to our perception of its worth or value.160 Rather, 
See discussion in Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 910 F.2d 479, 481-82 (8th Cir. 1990). 
One such law enacted by Louisiana referred to the remains of the "child." See Margaret S. v. 
Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 670 (E.D. La. 1984). Finding this law an unconstitutional burden on 
the woman's abortion decision, the court held: 
By requiring the physician to confront the woman with a choice on the method of dispo-
sal, the state suggests to the woman that it equates abortion with the taking of a human 
life. Such a suggestion can only serve to increase the woman's feelings of guilt and im-
pose a psychological burden on her. This requirement thus penalizes those women who 
exercise their constitutional right in choosing abortion. 
597 F. Supp. at 670 (citation omitted); see also PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 332 (describing 
the cultural variation in the treatment of intrauterine life: "some cultures bury fetuses like 
adults, others distinguish between miscarried and aborted fetuses for burial purposes, still 
others discard them indiscriminately 'in the refuse heap,' and at least one cannibalizes them 
'in times of famine' "). 
158. Petchesky notes: 
In the everyday practices of abortion and childbearing, more clearly than in opinion 
polls or surveys of attitudes, we can read the social record of a moral sense about abor-
tion ...• If 1.5 million abortions a year indicate a compelling need and desire for abor-
tion among women, we may also notice that between 92 and 96 percent of those 
abortions occur within the first trimester, and over half within the first eight weeks. 
These data are significant in understanding popular values about "fetal life." They con-
firm the sense that most women have, in term pregnancies, of developmental differences 
that correspond to differences, changes, in their relationship/obligation/bond to the fe-
tus. This sense determines, too, that a miscarriage often has a different meaning when it 
occurs in the first or second month of a pregnancy, when it may not even be noticed, 
than when it occurs in the fifth or sixth month, when it becomes the occasion of mourn-
ing - the loss of "someone." Even our ordinary language expresses this. We say, "She 
had a miscarriage," in the earlier case, and after some hard-to-define but real point later 
on, "She lost her baby." 
PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 351. 
159. Typically, women do not reveal that they are pregnant until after the first trimester, 
when the chances of miscarriage fall dramatically. See COLKER, supra note 125, at xvi. 
160. I do not want to underestimate the degree of historical and cultural specificity of the 
continuum of "meaning" that I have been exploring. In an era when women endured large 
numbers of pregnancies and faced high infant death rates, the death of a young infant proba-
bly meant considerably less than it would for a couple today who has postponed childbearing 
into their thirties. See LERNER, supra note 93, at 121 (noting that 25% of children born in 
England up until the 18th century died in their first year). But see Patricia Crawford, "The 
Sucking Child": Adult Attitudes to Child Care in the First Year of Life in Seventeenth Century 
England, 1 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 23 (1986). For an "infertile" couple using new reproduc-
tive technologies, the loss of frozen sperm or embryos might be something quite significant. 
See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993) (contestation of decedent's bequest 
of his cryogenically preserved sperm to his girlfriend); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 
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there may be at issue a degree of cultural and personal investment 
in a life, and the degree to which these have come to fruition in any 
given individual.161 
There is, of course, danger in a feminist approach to procreative 
decisionmaking that acknowledges intrauterine life. The first threat 
posed by this approach is the presumption that any acknowledge-
ment of the meaning or value of intrauterine life necessarily will 
lead to denial, or at the very least severe constraint, of women's 
access to abortion.162 The history of access to abortion since the 
Roe decision exemplifies this danger. The greater the status attrib-
uted to intrauterine life, it appears, the more narrow women's ac-
cess to abortion. This argument has been made by those who have 
been attributing the greatest value to intrauterine life - the "pro-
file" side of the abortion debate. To these advocates, valuing in-
trauterine life entails imbuing that life with legal rights that oppose 
the rights of a pregnant woman. Thus, in "pro-life" terms, "abor-
tion is murder." As I will go on to discuss below, a feminist vision 
of intrauterine life does not give rise to that conclusion.163 
A second danger is that a feminist acknowledgement of in-
trauterine life might result in protecting a particular "woman's" un-
derstanding of that value. Any legal recognition of such an 
understanding would result in enforcement of a particular unitary 
perception of the value of intrauterine life, belying the cultural, reli-
gious, and other differences that lead diverse groups of women to 
value intrauterine life differently. This peril does not obviate the 
need for a feminist version of "life" discourse, but it does require 
that women's subjective understandings of pregnancy and intrauter-
ine life be safeguarded. 
What, then, might a feminist articulation of the value of in-
trauterine life look like? It should translate into advocating that 
the state play a role in promoting the welfare of all intrauterine 
1992) (custody battle over frozen embryos). In a society in which the elderly were revered 
rather than relegated to old-age homes, the death of an old person might take on different 
meaning. 
161. Dworkin suggests that it is the degree of frustration of life, not its mere absence, that 
is deplored in premature deaths. See DwoRKIN, supra note 98, at 68-101. 
162. See Glendon, supra note 8, at 61-62. 
163. See infra text accompanying note 180. The Feminists for Life of America, however, 
argue that abortion on demand is bad for women because it forces them to kill their children. 
See Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion 
Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT Ooos 159 (Susan 
Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994). 
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life.164 This life must be valued regardless of the race of its parents, 
the age of its mother, or the socio-economic stratum into which it 
would be born if it were carried to term.16s The value of life carried 
by, for example, teenage women, or women receiving Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC), or women receiving AFDC 
who already have children, should not be any less in the eyes of the 
state than the life carried by women who do not rely on government 
aid for subsistence.166 The promotion of the welfare of intrauterine 
life may take many forms, all of which, within the framework I have 
been elaborating, allow women an expanded range of mothering 
choices.167 Intervening to prevent women's poverty will have a di-
rect correlation both with the health of intrauterine life and with 
164. See Hanigsberg, supra note 71, at 69-70; Johnsen, supra note 23, at 571 (arguing that 
"the most effective policies for improving the health of newborns are those that facilitate 
women's choices, not those that infringe on their liberty"); Rosalind Petchesky, Giving 
Women a Real Choice, THE NATION, May 28, 1990, at 732. 
165. As Frances Olsen has argued, "[f]etal life has value when people with power value 
it." Olsen, supra note 7, at 128. Dorothy Roberts has pointed to the devaluation of Black 
children as fundamental to the devaluation of Black mothering. See Dorothy E. Roberts, 
The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 871, 876-78 (1994); see also DERRICK 
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 162-77 (1987) 
(suggesting that White children would receive preferential treatment if an epidemic struck 
the nation's youth); Rickie Solinger, Race and "Value": Black and White Illegitimate Babies, 
1945-1965, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY, supra note 26, at 287; 
Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
913 (1994) (arguing against valuation of life based on race or culturally determined beauty). 
Lisa Ikemoto has called attention to the fact of socio-economic and race bias in devaluing 
motherhood and put this notion of "devalued motherhood" in historical context. See 
Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 1219-21. On the devaluation of Black motherhood more gener-
ally, see Roberts, supra note 107, at 1436-44; see also Austin, supra note 33, at 553 ("The 
material consequences that ... plague ... black women who have children despite their 
supposed role modeling responsibilities, are not inherent by-products of single pregnancy and 
motherhood. The condemnation and the economic hardships that follow in its wake are po-
litically and socially contingent."). 
166. Current American welfare reform proposals being discussed include denying addi-
tional cash assistance to welfare recipients who become pregnant or have additional children 
and refusing cash assistance for children born to unmarried women ages 17 and younger. See 
REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS, Mar. 10, 1995, at 3; see also Robert Pear, House Backs Bill Undo-
ing Decades of Welfare Policy: Control for the States: Measure to Cut $69 Billion in 5 years, 
Goes to Senate - Changes Are Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at Al, A9. 
167. Dawn Johnsen describes this as a "facilitative model": 
This model recognizes that women who bear children share the government's objective 
of promoting healthy births, but that existing obstacles - and not bad intentions -
impede the attainment of this common goal. Women inevitably must make numerous 
decisions that require them to balance varying and uncertain risks to fetal development 
against competing demands and interests in their lives. Rather than depriving women of 
the right to make these judgments or punishing women after the fact for making 
"wrong" choices, facilitative policies seek to expand women's choices .... 
Johnsen, supra note 23, at 571. I discuss the false adversary model of maternal-intrauterine 
life relationships to which Johnsen is responding at greater length in Hanigsberg, supra note 
71, at 43. 
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the number of babies who are carried to term.168 Targeting commu-
nity welfare will affect the health of intrauterine life carried by 
women in that community in a positive manner. For example, ac-
cess to drug treatment facilities for drug-addicted pregnant women 
and their children is necessary and currently largely unavailable.169 
Moreover, access to adequate prenatal medical care, education 
and nutrition for pregnant women would also promote the welfare 
of intrauterine life. A good example of the failed potential that ex-
ists is the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants 
and Children (WIC).170 WIC provides food supplements and nutri-
tional education and screening to needy pregnant, breastfeeding, 
and postpartum women and their infants, as well as to needy chil-
dren up to the age of five. The program, while federally funded, is 
administered by the states.171 The WIC program has proven to be 
highly successful in reducing the incidence of low birthweight, in-
fant mortality, and other infant health problems.172 The program, 
however, is so underfunded that only about half of the income-
eligible women and children are able to participate.173 This lack of 
funding has occurred despite the fact that WIC is so effective in 
improving infant health that expanding funding would result in sav-
168. Poverty poses a major risk of low birth weight infants. Low birth weight is a major 
predictor of infant mortality in the United States, and low birth weight babies also have a 
higher risk of a range of health problems later in life, including neurodevelopmental handi-
caps, congenital anomalies, mental retardation, blindness, autism, and growth and develop-
ment problems. See Siegel, supra note 10, at 345. 
169. Those facilities that take pregnant women generally do not provide childcare. See 
Testimony Presented to House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, lOlst 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1989) (statement of Wendy Chavkin), cited in Michelle Obennan, 
The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 
1, 9 n.35 (1992). See also U.S. GAO, DRUG-EXPOSED INFANTS, A GENERATION AT RISK 
(1990); Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. Pun. 
HEAL'IH 483 (1990); Wendy Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail Addicted Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, July 
1989, cited in Moss, supra note 107, at 287-88. For a critical analysis of therapeutic responses 
to pregnant drug users drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault, see Iris Marion Young, 
Punishment, Treatment, Empowerment: Three Approaches to Policy for Pregnant Addicts, 20 
FEMINIST STUD. 43-48 (1995). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1988) (originally enacted as § 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of 
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-642, § 17, 80 Stat. 885). 
171. Along with other welfare benefits, WIC is currently on the government chopping 
block. See Bob Herbert, Formula for Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at A23; Pear, supra 
note 166. 
172. See Johnsen, supra note 23, at 574-75 (citing CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY Pru. 
ORITlES, WIC: A WINNING STRATEGY FOR MATERNAL AND CHILD HEAL'IH (1990)); 
Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 
1323 (1993). 
173. See Johnson, supra note 23, at 575. 
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ings to the government in health assistance to low income women 
and children.174 
Would any of these suggestions obviate the need for abortions? 
The answer is no. In countries with a social welfare net beyond the 
wildest dreams of Americans, women still need abortion as a way to 
manage their procreative lives.175 Instead, promoting the welfare of 
intrauterine life also requires trusting women to make decisions 
about when it is best, when it is desirable, and when it is necessary 
that this life should not be carried to term and trusting that the 
pregnant woman is uniquely well-positioned to make decisions 
about the intrauterine life she carries.176 This involves a radical re-
versal from both legislative and judicial pronouncements that imply 
that women are not always legally qualified or entitled to make this 
determination by defining the right to abortion as a doctor's right to 
make medical decisions,177 by insisting on parental notification in 
the case of young women seeking abortions,178 or by notifying hus-
174. See id.; Spencer Rich, Mothers' Nutrition Program ls Effective, U.S. Study Finds, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1990, at A21; see also Loffredo, supra note 172, at 1323. 
175. Katha Pollitt states: 
Sweden has a system of social benefits and family supports that is more likely to be 
established on the moon than in the United States (where, as none of the kinder, gentler 
anti-choices have noticed, the trend is to cut, rather than expand, programs benefitting 
women and children). But even so, Swedish women abort at a hefty rate of25 percent of 
all pregnancies. 
Katha Pollitt, Abortion in the American Mind, THE NATION, May 25, 1992, at 718. 
176. As Petchesky notes: 
[I]t is pregnant women themselves whose consciousness is closest to the reality of the 
fetus and the total circumstances in which it exists. In the last analysis, their decisions 
are most likely to be morally informed. What the anti-abortion movement is about is the 
discrediting of women's moral judgment. 
PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 354. Petchesky draws upori Sara Ruddick's notion of "mater-
nal thinking" grounded in "maternal practice." See RUDDICK, supra note 65, at 17-27. 
For other arguments respecting the woman as the best decisionmaker, see Laurence 
Tribe, Structuring Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 296-98 (1975); Laurence 
Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973); Williams, supra note 90, at 
1592. 
177. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 764 (1986) (finding that certain informational requirements were unconstitutional 
based on their intrusion "upon the physician's exercise of proper professional judgment"); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 166 (1973) ("[T]he abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, 
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the 
physician."). 
178. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (upholding requirement 
that one parent consent to an unemancipated minor's abortion, with judicial bypass provi-
sion); Ohio v. Akron Reprod. Health Ctr., 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding parental notifica-
tion with judicial bypass provision); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (striking 
down requirement that both parents be notified before a minor's abortion but upholding 5-4 
a parental notification requirement that provided for judicial bypass); Planned Parenthood v. 
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983) (striking down Missouri parental consent requirement); 
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking down parental 
consent requirements); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411-13 (1981) (upholding in a 6-3 
decision a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify, if possible, parents of dependent un-
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bands of their wives' intent to obtain an abortion or requiring a 
husband's consent to a wife's abortion.179 
The gestational age of the intrauterine life might be one factor 
that would influence women considering abortion. Given the in-
creased moral significance that seems to attach to later term abor-
tions, a feminist approach to intrauterine life would seek to 
encourage and facilitate early term abortions, particularly those 
prior to quickening. These abortions comprise more than ninety 
percent of abortions and working toward making them accessible 
and safe would affect the greatest number of abortion-seekers.180 
One way of doing this would be to lobby for the legalization and 
widespread use of such abortifacients as RU-486, a pill that can in-
duce abortion early in pregnancy.1s1 For RU-486 to make a differ-
ence, however, it would have to be available to low-income women 
once it is approved.182 
married woman under 18 prior to performing abortion on narrow grounds as applied to "im-
mature" minor); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking down Massachusetts parental 
consent provisions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 {1976) (striking down a 
parental consent requirement for unmarried minor women); Renee Joyal, Ado/escentes, 
Avortement et Dignite, 3 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 234 {1989) {discussing a case of a fourteen-
year old who became pregnant while in a group home and whose request for an abortion was 
opposed by the Quebec Youth Protection Service). 
179. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31 (striking down in a 5-4 decision a husband notifica-
tion provision); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67-72 (striking down requirement of husband's written 
consent). 
180. See PETCHESKY, supra note 79, at 351 (noting that 92-96% of abortions occur in the 
first trimester); Council Report, Induced Termination of Pregnancy Before and After Roe v. 
Wade: Trends in Mortality and Morbiliity of Women, 268 JAMA 3231, 3238 {1992) (noting 
that about 50% of women who have abortions after 15 weeks do so because of financial 
difficulties). 
181. RU-486 blocks the action of the hormone progesterone which is crucial to maintain-
ing a pregnancy. Blocking progesterone results in a breakdown of the bond between the 
embryo and uterine wall, resulting in uterine bleeding and contractions that eject the embryo. 
RU-486 is currently available in France, Britain, and Sweden. To date, the drug has been 
shown to be remarkably safe. See Clark, supra note 8, at 302-05. RU-486 has not yet re-
ceived Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for use in the United States, largely 
because of pro-life lobbying. See Tamar Lewin, Plans for Abortion Pill Stalled in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at A17. On October 27, 1994, a New York-based non-profit organiza-
tion, the Population Council, announced that clinical trials of RU-486 were being conducted. 
See Clinical Trials on Non-Surgical Abortion Commence in U.S., REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS, 
Nov. 4, 1994, at 5. The Council announced its intention to submit the data from the clinical 
trials to the FDA with its application for approval of the drug. The Council expects the FDA 
to approve the drug in 1996. See id. 
182. Although the vocal anti-abortion movement vigorously lobbies against legalization 
of RU-486 in this country, see Jerry Grey, Issue of Abortion Is Pushing Its Way to Center 
Stage, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at Al, A9 {"The Christian Coalition and other groups have 
also called for legislation to overturn executive orders that allowed Federal money to be used 
for ... clinical testing of the abortion drug RU-486 •.•• "),the drug holds promise as a 
potential point of compromise in the abortion debate. At least one author, who locates her-
self as neither pro-choice nor pro-life, has suggested that RU-486 would be welcome to 
"moderates" because it could reduce the number of later-term abortions that may be consid-
ered more morally objectionable. See Clark, supra note 8, at 305. 
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One benefit of the use of RU-486 is that it is highly respectful of 
women's bodily integrity. Unlike a surgical abortion, which re-
quires a doctor to enter a woman's body with medical instruments, 
and from which a woman is usually shut out as she lies supine, feet 
in stirrups, with a sheet draped over her, the use of RU-486 pro-
vides the woman much greater agency in and control over the abor-
tion process.1s3 Simply making an abortion pill available would not, 
however, be enough to meet the needs of large numbers of women. 
The circumstances that result in later term abortions need to be 
addressed, including delays imposed by parental and husband noti-
fication requirements.184 An adequate system of sex education 
must also address the lack of knowledge some women, particularly 
young and poor women, have about their bodies that results in late 
detection of pregnancy.185 In addition, because RU-486 must be 
used within the first seven or eight weeks of pregnancy, it would not 
be useful in the case of abnormalities detected through amni-
ocentesis nor for pregnancies discovered later, such as those of ado-
lescent or premenopausal women who have irregular menstrual 
cycles. 
In addition to a woman's consideration of how close her preg-
nancy is to term, a woman's decision would depend upon her own 
assessment of her ability to mother effectively and her assessment 
of the quality of life that the intrauterine life could reasonably be 
183. See Clark, supra note 8, at 306 (citing Marge Berer, "Inducing a Miscarriage": 
Women-Centered Perspectives on RU-486/Prostaglandin as an Early Abortion Method, 20 
LAw, MEo. & HEALTII CARE 199, 201 (1992)). This greater autonomy may be a double-
edged sword because the RU-486 process is much more solitary and can be more alienating 
as a result. These very facts, however, may silence some members of the abortion opposition 
who are concerned about the idea of capricious abortion-seekers. See Clark, supra note 8, at 
307 n.198 ("At first glance, the availability of RU-486 would seem likely to heighten [the] 
concern [that some abortion decisions are casually made and too easily carried out]. But if 
the discourse on RU-486 were expanded beyond its present state, it might help persuade 
those who believe otherwise that abortion through use of a pill is an emotionally and physi-
cally demanding process that women would not undertake )ightly."). Of course, hard-line 
anti-abortion advocates do not find any of the arguments in favor of RU-486 compelling. 
184. Notice requirements also appear to increase the health risks of abortion to women. 
See Council Report, supra note 180, at 3237. 
185. See Ruth Colker, Feminist Consciousness and the State: A Basis for Cautious Opti-
mism (Review of Toward a Feminist Theory of the State by Catharine A. MacKinnon), 90 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1167 (1990) (noting that "[t]wenty-four percent of the women who 
terminate their pregnancies through abortion are teenagers. Thirty-three percent have fam-
ily incomes under $11,000."); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Re-
vamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE LJ. 639, 683 (1986) (explaining that young women are more 
likely to seek later term abortions because of irregular menstrual cycles that make it more 
difficult to detect pregnancy, denial of their pregnancy until it cannot be ignored, and fear of 
their parents' reactions); Sara Ruddick, Procreative Choice for Adolescent Women, in THE 
POUTICS OF PREGNANCY 126, 134-38 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993) 
{describing what she calls "education for choice"). 
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expected to have if born.186 Such considerations would include the 
extent to which the state promotes the welfare of pregnant women 
and their children. 
How, one might ask, does trusting women to make abortion de-
cisions constitute concern for intrauterine life? It acknowledges 
that sometimes the life circumstances surrounding a given preg-
nancy are such that to carry the intrauterine life to term would have 
a deleterious effect on that life, the life of the pregnant woman, and 
perhaps other lives as well. As the director of the Women's Medi-
cal Center of Madison, Wisconsin, puts it: 
Women know when we don't have the resources to be the mother we 
expect to be. Those resources may be lacking because of rape, incest, 
alcohol, youth, poverty or an abusive relationship, but the resulting 
despair is the same. Women have abortions because they are aware 
of the overwhelming responsibility of motherhood. Of course, those 
who choose to punish will have to continue escalating the penalty for 
abortion. Violence, or even the thought of an eternity in hell, is noth-
ing compared to a woman's own despair over an unwanted 
pregnancy.187 
As we understand that women may give up a child for adoption for 
the child's own good, similarly the decision to abort and care for 
intrauterine life are not inconsistent.188 
CONCLUSION: CORPOREALITY MEETS DUALITY 
The abortion decision, like other mothering decisions, occurs 
within a framework of circumstances that the pregnant woman con-
fronts. Far from a de facto devaluation of life, the abortion decision 
can be life-affirming in itself, by both acknowledging the impor-
tance of the woman's life and intrauterine life, and by recognizing 
the imperfection of the social contexts into which children are born. 
By contrast, abortion law centers around notions of rights, 
boundaries, and autonomy in the liberal sense of the individual citi-
zen able to structure his decisionmaking free of state coercion. The 
underlying supposition of this view of abortion is that women's bod-
ily integrity can be violated and that the state needs to mediate be-
tween intrauterine life and mother, between mother and womb. 
186. These concerns also would include both social and medical issues - for example, 
the intrauterine life's genetic make-up, ranging from diagnosis of Down's Syndrome to Tay 
Sachs, and whether it had been exposed to toxins in utero such as alcohol or drugs. See also 
DAVIS, supra note 27, at 204-05 (describing the social conditions contributing to Black 
women's "reluctant" decisions to abort). 
187. Karlin, supra note 145, at 32. 
188. See MacKinnon, supra note 154, at 1313 ("Many women have abortions as a desper-
ate act of love for their unborn children."). 
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Notionally, women's wombs and their contents can be abstracted 
from women themselves, and women's decisionmaking about the 
contents of their own bodies entails a conflict of rights. The way 
the law frames these decisions pays no attention to the subjective 
realities of mothering decisions, and the law fails to see the body 
that surrounds the intrauterine life, thereby both erasing the mater-
nal and reducing women to it. The law is unable to "see" corporeal 
materiality - unable to account for how bodies, particularly female 
bodies, matter. 
The political and legal constructions that pit women's self-
interest, and assert that this interest must be a unified and fixed 
one, against a concern for "fetal life" fundamentally misconstrue 
the relationships of women to their own bodies and to intrauterine 
life. By envisioning women as uniform containers that may be emp-
tied at will, the law ignores and perhaps destroys any concept of 
women's bodily integrity, nullifies the role of the mother, and at the 
same time, paradoxically, establishes women's bodies as always ma-
ternal. Neither the law, as a fundamental system of symbolization, 
and as a real and inflexible structure of constraints and require-
ments, nor the fact that the law cannot serve a "neutral" role vis-a-
vis women and their relationship with procreativity can be ignored. 
Women's right to bodily integrity must be protected, and women's 
own multiple understandings of intrauterine life must serve as the 
anchor for the interaction of law and their procreativity. The mean-
ing that women ascribe to their abortions, to their mothering deci-
sions, and to intrauterine life is crucial to this legal process. Any 
legal construction that keeps women from making these decisions 
will reaffirm procreativity as the object of male domination. A 
reconceived right to abortion would be transformative because it 
insists that women define how mothering matters to them and be-
cause this right would be situated within a framework that asserts 
the primacy of both the liberty to have children and not to have 
them. This process would be a revolutionary task for a legal system 
that seeks to choose between stories, to look for the correct version 
of events, to ignore multiple accounts of experiences and to abide 
by only one mens rea.189 Law is thus of necessity tom between its 
need for what it interprets to be certainty and its regulation of 
189. I discuss this issue in greater detail in Julia E. Hanigsberg, An Essay on The Piano, 
Law, and the Search for Women's Desire, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1995). 
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human subjectivities in their necessarily multiple and mobile 
complexity.190 
The law must also face the fact that women have changing bod-
ies - the fact that (most) women's bodies can become pregnant. 
The law is ambivalent about motherhood and discomforted by the 
state of pregnancy, the fact of intrauterine life, and the complexity 
of its relationship to the pregnant woman. A law tom between pro-
tecting the mother or the intrauterine life sees in the primacy of 
rights no possibility of the immediacy of interdependence or the 
paradox of duality within unity. Whatever procreative decision a 
woman makes in such a legal regime presupposes a denial of her 
agency over her bodily integrity and a usurpation of the meaning of 
intrauterine life from her experiences. The body becomes colo-
nized by such state regulation; it becomes a place on a map that has 
been redrawn on many occasions, in many cultures, to signify the 
boundaries of gender and the imprimatur of those empowered to 
seal off one territory from another. By reconceptualizing the abor-
tion decision within the context of mothering decisions, feminists 
can begin to examine the meaning of intrauterine life without fall-
ing into the trap of forgetting about women. 
For the more than two decades since Roe, the pro-choice move-
ment has dodged the question of the meaning of intrauterine life. 
The right to legal, safe, and accessible abortion is still at risk. Both 
personally and politically the time has come to articulate a feminist 
interpretation of the abortion issue that is explicit about intrauter-
ine life, not to forge compromise, but to enrich the discussion of 
procreativity per se. 
190. See KA1HY E. FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: V1s10Ns OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FEMI· 
NIST THEORY 155-83 (1993). 
